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The United States Army began a sweeping Transformation process in the late 
1990’s.  The goal of Army Transformation is to field an Objective Force.  “The Objective 
Force is our future full spectrum force: organized, manned, equipped, and trained to be 
more strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and 
sustainable across the entire spectrum of military operations from major theater wars 
through counter terrorism to homeland security.”1   
The Army has identified space operations as a key enabler to combat operations 
today and even more so in the future.  The Objective Force will rely on space operations 
for success on the battlefield.  “Terrestrial systems alone will not enable full-spectrum 
dominance.  The Army views space as a vertical extension of the battlefield, and space 
capabilities are key force multipliers for land force operations.”2  The Army has become 
increasingly dependent on space-based products and services. 
The Army has been active in space for more than 50 years and has often had a 
leading role in the military’s successes in this mission area.  The focus of today’s Army 
space activity is to embed space support in the emerging Objective Force.  Army space 
operators are in Space Support Elements organic to the Division level, organic to Corps 
headquarters as Space Operations Officers and attached as Army Space Support Teams to 
Joint and Service commands as directed.  The Army’s space expertise comes from a 
small number of “Space Cadre”. The core of the Army’s Space Cadre is roughly 150 
officers that make up the Space Operations Career Field.  
The Army’s 1st Space Brigade is an operational unit that provides space support to 
Joint, Service and Multi-national operations through the attachment of various space 
elements.  However, for Army Space operations to remain a relevant combat multiplier it 
must be clearly linked to the Army Transformation effort.  The focus of Army 
                                                 
1 Rumsfeld, Donald H. Annual Report to the President and the Congress [database online] (2002 
[cited 18 August 2005]}); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2002/, 122. 
2 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 123. 
2 
Transformation is the Objective Force.  Accordingly, Space Operations Officers and 
space support activities must focus on support to the Objective Force.  This focus resulted 
in the formation of Space Support Elements organic at the Division level in the Objective 
Force.  If space is not clearly part of the Objective Force it will not emerge from the 
Transformation process as a critical enabler.   
This paper will address why the Army is involved in space from historical, 
doctrinal and policy perspectives.  After looking at the current Army space force 
structure, space missions, and Army Transformation; the inclusion of space forces in this 
Transformation process will be detailed.  The primary takeaway is to understand the units 
that are emerging from the Transformation process and know how Army space elements 
are designed to support them. 
The current and planned Army Space force structure will be explained and what 
tasks and capabilities they are expected to provide.  A principal issue is at what level and 
to what strength should space elements be embedded in the Objective Force 
organizations.  The trade-offs and differences between the Army Space Support Teams 
(ARSST) at the 1st Space Battalion and the Division-organic Space Support Elements 
(SSE) will be discussed. 
The FA40 Career Field is a relatively new personnel category and the 
development of the FA40 community will be explained.  Personnel requirements and a 
proper distribution of the low-density FA40 community is a critical part of assuring 
success of the FA40 Career field, as well as the success of Army and Joint Space 
Operations. 
A brief review of what equipment the ARSST, SSE and other Space Battalion 
assets utilize will be included.  The operational requirements documents that are required 
to equip space forces will be assessed.  Future systems that will equip future space forces 
will also be reviewed.  In depth equipment capabilities and parameters will not be 
covered.  A brief listing of the equipment used by the Army’s space forces to perform 
their mission sets will be identified.  
The different Service-unique perspectives of organizing space forces and 
organizations will be detailed.  Differences in operational space focus, force structure and 
3 
personnel requirements will be contrasted.  The emergence of a U.S. Space Force will 
also be discussed.  Lastly, recommendations for how the Army can reorganize its force 
structure, allocate personnel and develop future space capabilities requirements 
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II. THE ARMY AND SPACE 
A. OVERVIEW 
The Army has been involved in Space for more than fifty years.  This chapter will 
outline the Army’s history in Space and establish how and why the Army became 
involved in the nation’s space operations.  The United States Army Space and Missile 
Defense Command can trace the marriage of these two mission areas back to technology 
development that occurred decades ago.  This relationship between the Army’s Space and 
Missile Defense communities still exists today.   
The Army Space forces can trace their current organization to a rich history of 
Service space experience, Joint/Service Space doctrine, and National, Joint and Service 
Space policies.  It is important to understand the Army’s perspective on space, the 
existing Space forces and their doctrinal foundations to be able to trace the inclusion of 
space operations elements in the Army’s changing force structure.  Section D of this 
chapter will follow the evolution of Army space policy and doctrine.  This changing 
doctrine resulted in an expanded Space mission area.  The Army’s operational space 
force structure reflects this expanded space mission.  Doctrine and policy are the 
foundation for operational forces.  Understanding Service and Joint policy and doctrine is 
necessary to understand Army space.  
The Army has an operational 1st Space Brigade.  The Brigade supports Joint and 
Service operations worldwide.  This chapter will look at the existing Army Space units, 
their construct and missions.  It is important to know the Army’s current space units and 
their roles in order to understand how the Army Space will allocate and position space 
operators in the emerging Objective Force, the Army’s 21st Century fighting force. 
B.        THE ARMY’S HISTORY IN SPACE  
In the 20th Century, the Army fully exploited the high ground provided by 
air capabilities and led the nation to space.  In the 21st Century we must 
fully exploit the high ground of space to empower adaptive leaders and 
soldiers with the ability to see first, understand first, act first and finish 
decisively.3 
                                                 
3 Department of the Army, Army Space Policy, par 18 (April 2003 [cited 17 May 2005]); 
available from World Wide Web @ http://www4.army.mil/FA40/data/files/pdf/armySpacePolicy.pdf 
6 
The Army has a long history of work in the space mission area that rivals their 
sister Services and dates back over 50 years.  The Army became involved in space 
technology development shortly after World War II.  In 1945, German scientist, Werner 
von Braun, and over 100 missile development experts were removed from Germany and 
placed under the supervision of the Army at Fort Bliss, Texas.  Known as Operation 
Paperclip, the Army and von Braun’s team of scientists “provided valuable information 
about the design and construction of missiles and rockets which had application to both 
the tactical weapon and space vehicle arenas.”4   
By 1949, Dr von Braun and his cohorts launched the Bumper Round 5 rocket, 
which was the first missile to reach outer space.  Shortly thereafter von Braun and the 
Army Ordnance Rocket Research and Development Division moved from Fort Bliss, 
Texas to Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama.  The Redstone Arsenal was 
designated the Army’s Ordnance Rocket Center.  In 1952, the Ordnance Rocket Center 
produced the first Redstone missiles.5  The Redstone missile would be the springboard for 
the first U.S. satellite in space.  The linkage established between space, missiles and 
Redstone Arsenal still exists today in the Army’s space structure and doctrine.  This 
space and missile commonality will be addressed later in the paper. 
Although the initial focus of Operation paperclip was the development of an 
IRBM, the Bumper Round 5 launch into space and the Redstone missile would evolve 
this long-range missile technology into the first satellite launch vehicle.  As early as 
1954, von Braun wrote a thesis that “proposed using the Redstone missile as the main 
booster of a four-stage rocket for launching artificial satellites.”6  This plan later became 
the joint Army-Navy effort called Project Orbiter.    
                                                 
4 Hughes, Kayleen, Dr. “Pioneering Efforts on Space,” par. 2 [U.S. Army Missile Command 
Historical Office website] (1990 [cited 8 May 2005]); available from World Wide Web 
@http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/pioneer/welcome.html 
5 Redstone Arsenal Military History Office, “The Army at Redstone Arsenal: Significant 
Accomplishments in Space, 1948 to 1961” par. 8 [Redstone Arsenal website] (cited 8 May 2005); available 
from World Wide Web @ http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/arspace/arspace_chronology.html 
6 Hughes, par. 5. 
7 
The Navy was developing a plan to put a satellite into space using the Viking 
missile.  This Navy effort was called Project Vanguard.  The Army developed a 
concurrent plan based on the Jupiter missile.  The Army’s Jupiter missile evolved from 
the Redstone and the addition of upper stage rockets.  In July 1955, President Eisenhower 
“announced that the United States would undertake the construction of man-made 
satellites.”7  This decision would test the work done by Operation Paperclip, Project 
Vanguard and Project Orbiter and ultimately put the Army at the pinnacle of the U.S. 
space effort.   
In 1955, the Navy became the chair of the Secretary of Defense’s Ballistic Missile 
Committee.  Soon after, the Navy’s Project Vanguard was chosen to carry out the 
Presidential announcement of U.S. satellite launch.  The Army Ballistic Missile Agency 
(ABMA) was activated at Redstone Arsenal in February 1956.  The ABMA mission was 
specifically military in nature; develop the first IRBM for the Army.  The Army’s work 
with the Jupiter missile and satellite launch continued however under “special orders” but 
never became part of the ABMA’s assigned mission.  The Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) consistently told the ABMA from May 1956 to May 1957 that there was 
no plan for the Jupiter missile to launch a satellite.  Consequently, ABMA conducted no 
preparation to use a Jupiter missile as a satellite launch vehicle.8 
In the fall of 1957 the Soviet Union won the race to space.  Sputnik I was 
successfully launched in October and Sputnik II followed in November.  The Navy’s 
Project Vanguard was not able to follow the Soviets into space and the Secretary of the 
Army submitted a proposal to OSD for satellite launch on a Jupiter C missile.  OSD 
directed the Army on 22 November 1957 to launch a Jupiter C satellite.  Seventy days 
later, the Army’s Jupiter C missile successfully placed the Explorer I satellite into orbit 
on 31 January 1958.9 
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Over the next two and a half years, the ABMA recorded amazing 
accomplishments in space launch and development.  The Pioneer III and IV spacecraft 
lunar probes traveled into space on Jupiter C launch vehicles in December 1958 and 
March 1959 respectively.  The ABMA put four additional Earth-orbiting satellites into 
space and also developed and launched the Jupiter nose cones with primates inside, 
proving the ability for living creatures to survive space flight.  These early tests with nose 
cone recovery, the developmental work on the 1.5 million pound booster known as the 
Saturn Program, and the successful development and launch of the Mercury-Redstone 
missile all resulted in the first space flights of Alan Shepard and Virgil Grissom.10   
During the months of early success in 1958, President Eisenhower had already 
implemented decisions that would lead to the decline of Army activities in space.  In 
April 1958, Eisenhower recommended that a civilian agency be created to control 
nonmilitary space activities.  Three months later the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) was established when the President signed the National 
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.  The Army Ordnance and Missile Command 
(AOMC) was activated in 1958 at Redstone Arsenal to provide centralized control of the 
various space and missile programs in which the Army was involved.  The ABMA was a 
subordinate unit within AOMC.11 
On 1 July 1960, NASA’s George C. Marshall Space Flight Center was officially 
opened at Redstone Arsenal.  With Marshall Space Center established, the AOMC and 
ABMA turned over all buildings, equipment, civilian employees and space programs to 
NASA.  This ended the Army’s leadership and influence in formal space programs for 
over 20 years: 
Between 1961 and 1975, Vietnam turned the Army from Space and using 
Space-based instruments as a force multiplier.  Satellites did not offer 
direct tactical aid to the Soldier – assisting communication was the only 
way Space-based assets intervened in ground fighting.  Instead of thinking 
about Space-based assets that could be used as force or to shape future 
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wars, the Army moved to field effective tactical weapons troops could use 
immediately – thinking about the future was self-indulgent luxury.12  
    The Army’s reemergence in the space mission area began in 1973 with the 
establishment of the Army Space Program Office (ASPO).  ASPO’s mission was and is 
the development of systems and methods to leverage the Tactical Exploitation of 
National Capabilities Program (TENCAP) for the tactical warfighter’s benefit.13  By 
using the products from the national intelligence community and the national technical 
means (NTM) overhead systems to enhance the ability of tactical commanders, the Army 
began to shake off the Vietnam-era thought pattern in which development and use of 
space-based force multipliers for future battlefields was an unsupportable “luxury”.   
The incorporation of space-based products and services with the Army’s military 
decision process (MDP) was energized by the development of the AirLand Battle 
Doctrine.  Internal Army debate about current and emerging threats and the AirLand 
Battle Doctrine created a renewed interest in space by the Service’s leadership.  “It was 
then that the Army determined the ground commander’s needs required it to return to 
space.  Space-related activities offered the ground commanders unique platforms for 
observation, positioning, and communication over a greatly expanded battlefield.”14 
The other Services also began to refocus their attention on long range planning 
and investment in space programs and organizations.  In 1982 and 1983, the Air Force 
and Navy established Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and Naval Space Command 
respectively.  President Reagan made public the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 
1983 and this further energized Army leadership to study the potential of space in support 
of the warfighter and what role the Army should play in this mission area.  “In August  
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1984, an Army Space Council was created in Washington to coordinate and approve 
proposals and provide direction for the Army’s involvement in and use of Space among 
various functionally organized staff offices.”15  
After the Army leadership reviewed “Lessons Learned” from Operation Urgent 
Fury in Grenada in the fall of 1983, General Maxwell Thurman, Vice Chief of Staff of 
the Army, directed the establishment of an Army Staff Field Element at the Air Force 
Space Command headquarters.16  This initial element would evolve into the Army Space 
Command (ARSPACE) and then to its current title as the U.S Army Forces Strategic 
Command (ARSTRAT).  What started as doctrinal changes and new ways of thinking 
with respect to space and tactical warfighting, became Army organizations and advisory 
groups charged with managing the Service’s space activities and developing long-term 
goals for the Army in the space mission area.   
The Army’s early Space management structure in 1984 had four elements: the 
Army Space Council, an Army Space Working group to support the Space Council, the 
Army Space Program Office (ASPO), and the Army Staff Field Element at AFSPC.  The 
Army Space Council charged ASPO with five short-term tasks:  
1)  Develop an Army Space policy 
2)  Create an inventory of existing Army Space-related 
 requirements and programs 
3)  Create immediate enhancements to key areas of Army Space   
 involvement 
4)  Develop an operational concept for Space support to warfighting 
5)  Develop Army options for supporting a unified Space command17 
The Army’s efforts to leverage space and assist tactical commanders were 
energized in the early 1980’s.  One of the first formal steps was the establishment of the 
Army Space Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 1986.   The Institute was 
responsible for creating Army Space concepts, doctrine, training and equipment.  It was 
also responsible for taking Space to the soldiers and tactical commanders so they would 
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know how to leverage space-based products and services.  This introductory program 
started in 1987 was called the Army Space Demonstration Program and the Army Space 
Exploitation Demonstration Program.  This program was the forerunner of the Army 
Space Support Team (ARSST).  The culmination of this initial, Army-centric space 
capabilities development, demonstration and support was the activation of the Army 
Space Command in Colorado Springs, Colorado in 1988.18 
The early demonstration programs provided more than hands-on displays to 
soldiers and educational platforms for Army leadership.  The personnel from these early 
space demonstration teams deployed to support Army units during Operation Desert 
Storm in 1990, in Haiti in 1994 and in Bosnia in 1996 even though they were not initially 
designed or intended to accompany tactical units on combat missions.  “After the first 
Gulf War, the Army Space support program was energetically developed.”19  This was 
partially due to the personal interest of the Army Chief of Staff, General Sullivan, who 
directed space support be embedded in numerous high profile Army experiments and 
exercises from 1992-1996. 
The focus of Army senior leadership on space support to the warfighter resulted 
in ARSPACE developing a space support capability specifically designed to deploy in 
support of tactical operations.  This next step in the evolution of the space demonstration 
teams was the Contingency Operations – Space (COPS) that ARSPACE activated in 
1994.20  The COPS space support teams were created to fill the tactical support, 
deployable mission.  The final version of the ARSST evolved from the COPS construct.  
The first deployment of the modern-day ARSST in support of combat operations was in 
1996 with the 1st Infantry Division in Tuzla, Bosnia.   
The ARSST teams experienced ever-increasing support requirements from 1996-
1998 and the concept of operations (CONOPS) for deployment of ARSST teams became 
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more clearly defined.  Because of the heightened awareness of space support by Army 
leadership due to increased deployments of ARSST teams, the Army activated a new 
functional area, FA40 or Space Operations Officer, “to deal with the warfighting 
implications of Space operations from a leadership development and training 
perspective.”21  Prior to the activation of FA40s, Army officers from almost every branch 
would fill Army space billets for 2 to 3 years and then return to their respective basic 
branch.  The majority of the officers were from the Military Intelligence, Signal and Air 
Defense Artillery branches.  The FA40 career path enables officers to stay in the Space 
Career Field and remain viable for future promotions. 
The Transformation of the Army in the late 1990’s saw a marked change in 
organizational structure from the “Divisional Army” to a lighter, faster “Modular Army”.  
Chapter III will specifically look at the details of Army Transformation and follow the 
emergence of the Space Support Element (SSE) and the role of the FA40 in the present 
day. 
C. THE ARMY’S CURRENT ROLE IN SPACE 
The current Army Space mission area and personnel are under the United States 
Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC).  USASMDC or SMDC as it 
is commonly referred can trace its space roots to the Strategic Defense Initiative of 1983.  
As a result of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the United States Army Strategic Defense 
Command (USASDC) was established in 1985.  USASDC incorporated parts of the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and primarily focused on classic missile 
defense roles. USASDC also explored the use and development of anti-satellite weapons 
and this way began to taking command responsibility of the Army’s initial space 
activities.   
In 1992, the USASDC became the United States Army Space and Strategic 
Defense Command (USASSDC).  This change corresponds to the Army leadership’s 
reenergized interest in space.  ARSPACE, formed in 1988, became a part of the  
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USASSDC.  The Army Space Technology Research Office and ASPO transferred to 
USASSDC in 1993 and 1994 respectively, and USASSDC is designated the Army’s 
advocate for space.22 
In 1997, the USASSDC was reflagged as the United States Army Space and 
Missile Defense Command (USASMDC).  SMDC was also the Army Service 
Component Command (ARSPACE) to the United States Space Command (SPACECOM) 
at this time.  Note that the original ARSPACE organization founded in 1988 was not the 
Service Component Command to the SPACECOM; it was a liaison element to AFSPC.  
When the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Commands merged to form the 
new U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in Omaha, Nebraska, ARSPACE was 
reorganized and renamed ARSTRAT.  With this organizational construct, SMDC is a 
dual-hatted command – as an Army Major Command (MACOM) and the Army Service 
Component Command to STRATCOM.   
As a MACOM, SMDC has a 3-star headquarters in Arlington, Virginia.  The two 
major subcomponents of SMDC are Deputy Commanding General for Operations (DCG-
OPS) in Colorado Springs, Colorado and the Deputy to the Commander for Research 
Development and Acquisition (RDA) in Huntsville, Alabama.  Within this organizational 
construct “USARSPACE (now ARSTRAT) remains the operational component to 
USSPACECOM (now STRATCOM), and USASSDC (now SMDC) remains the Army 
leader in missile defense technology, continuing its research and development to support 
both strategic and tactical missile defense systems.”23   
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Figure 1. USASMDC Organization Chart24 
The Mission Statement for SMDC/ARSTRAT is as follows: 
As an Army major command (MACOM) and the Army Service 
Component to USSTRATCOM, SMDC/ARSTRAT conducts space 
operations and provides planning, integration, control and coordination of 
Army forces and capabilities in support of USSTRATCOM missions; 
serves as proponent for space and ground-based midcourse defense and as 
Army operational integrator for global missile defense; conducts mission 
related research, development, and acquisition in support of Army Title 10 
responsibilities and serves as the focal point for desired characteristics and 
capabilities in support of USSTRATCOM missions.25  
This paper will address in-depth only the active duty operational units under the 
Deputy Commanding General Operations (DCG-OPS) and manned by FA40 Space 
officers.  These are primarily those elements in the 1st Space Brigade and 1st Space  
                                                 
24 U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, “Organization and Staff,” par. 2 
[government website] (cited 6 July 2005) available on World Wide Web @ 
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Battalion.  Although the Future Warfare Center (FWC) has active duty FA40s manning 
the officer billets, any discussion pertaining to the FWC will be in the context of their 
manning requirements and combat development efforts in the Space mission area. 
 
Figure 2 SMDC/ARSTRAT Organization Chart26 
 The 1st Space Brigade, located in Colorado Springs at Peterson Air Force Base, is 
commanded by an FA40 Colonel.  The 1st Space Brigade Mission Statement is to: 
Conduct continuous, global space support, space control and space force 
enhancement operations in support of USSTRATCOM and Supported 
Combatant Commanders enabling the delivery of decisive combat 
power.27 
The 1st Space Brigade executes its mission through its three subordinate battalions.  1st 
Brigade is the only command opportunity for Space officers in the rank of Colonel.  The 
Space Brigade has three subordinate battalions as shown in the Figure 2 wire diagram. 
The 1st Satellite Control Battalion, also located in Colorado Springs at Peterson 
Air Force Base, is the “Army’s longest serving space battalion” and is responsible for 
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operating the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) ground stations.28   The 
1st Satellite Control Battalion is a pure signal unit and is only manned by signal officers 
and soldiers.     
The 193rd Space Support Battalion is a Colorado Army National Guard unit and is 
also located at Peterson Air Force Base.  This paper will not address either the 193rd or 
the 1st Satellite Control Battalion in further detail.  For the purposes of this paper, I will 
only assess active duty units within the Army space community.  The detailed manning 
and equipping of the 1st Space Battalion will be addressed in Chapters V and VI.   
The 1st Space Battalion is composed of four companies and a stand-alone team.  
These subordinate elements are the Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), the 
1st Space Company, 2nd Space Company, 3rd Space Company, and the Commercial 
Exploitation Team (CET).  
 
Figure 3. 1st Space Battalion Organization Chart29 
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The 1st Space battalion is commanded by an FA40 Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) and 
is the Army’s only command opportunity for FA40s in the rank of LTC.  The 1st Space 
Battalion Mission Statement is: 
Plan, coordinate, integrate and synchronize execution of Space Force 
Enhancement Functions; provide continuous assured Theater Ballistic 
Missile Warning, Combined Early Warning and Battlespace 
Characterization; conduct Space Control and Information Operations; and 
provide commercial satellite imagery data in support of Army, Joint and 
Combined Forces.30 
The Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) is commanded by an FA40 
Major and includes the Battalion Commander, Executive Officer and the Command 
Sergeant Major.  The Battalion’s Personnel and Administration Section (S1), Intelligence 
Section (S2), Operations Section (S3), Logistics Section (S4) and Communications 
Section (S6) are elements within the HHC.  The HHC mission statement is: 
Deploys and sustains 1st Space Battalion assets; executes command and 
control (C2) of space assets in order to coordinate, integrate and 
synchronize efforts of battalion assets across the battlefield; provides 
commercial imagery and air suite mission C2 to combatant commanders.31 
 
Figure 4. Headquarters Organizational Chart32 
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The 1st Space Company or the Joint Tactical Ground Stations (JTAGS) Company 
is under the command of an FA40 Major and is consists of three detachments.  Each 
detachment has two JTAGS sections for a total of six systems.  The JTAGS are deployed 
worldwide to support Joint Theater operations.  The JTAGS crew members are primarily 
Air Defense Artillery soldiers.  The 193rd Space Support Battalion (Colorado National 
Guard) does not have a JTAGS company; it is DoD-unique to the 1st Space Battalion.  
The 1st Space Company mission is as follows: 
Provide continuous assured Theater Ballistic Missile Warning, Combined 
Early Warning and Battlespace Characterization to EUCOM, PACOM, 
CENTCOM and STRATCOM Combatant Commanders.  On order, 
deploy a section globally in support of contingency operations.33  
 
Figure 5. 1st Space Company Organization Chart34 
The 2nd Space Company or the ARSST Company, commanded by an FA40 
Major, consists of eight Army Space Support Teams.  Of the eight ARSST teams, four 
are manned by Reserve Component (RC) soldiers.  The ARSST construct was initially 
designed to habitually support Corps and echelons-above-corps (EAC).  However, the 
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) proved to be too high and habitual association of the 
ARSSTs with their supported Corps ended.  The 2nd Company ARSSTs are deployed 
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worldwide to provide in-Theater support at the operational and strategic level and to 
augment SSEs at the tactical (UEx) and operational (UEy) levels.  The 2nd Space 
Company mission is: 
Deploy globally to plan, coordinate, integrate and synchronize execution 
of the Space Force Enhancement Functions, Space Control and space 
situational awareness, in support of military and civil operations.35 
 
Figure 6. 2nd Space Company Organization Chart36 
The 3rd Space Company (Provisional), commanded by an FA40 Major, has two 
detachments.  The Space Electronic Warfare Detachment (SEWD) ground suite is located 
at Colorado Springs and the SEWD air suite is at Kirtland Air Force Base.  The term 
“Provisional” indicates the company force structure is not currently recognized by the 
Army’s Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) documentation.  
Because of its provisional status, it is manned by soldiers from the 2nd Space Company.  
Future MTOE documents will include this force structure.  The mission of the 3rd Space 
Company is: 
Deploy globally and conduct Space Control and Information Operations 
by providing ground mobile surveillance and assessment of space systems; 
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and specialized airborne test and evaluation of command, control and 
information systems.37 
 
Figure 7. 3rd Space Company Organization Chart38 
The Commercial Exploitation Team (CET), commanded by an FA40 Major, is 
another DoD-unique system in the 1st Space Battalion.  The CET is manned by active and 
reserve soldiers and equipped with the Eagle Vision II direct downlink system.  The CET 
mission is: 
Acquire direct down-linked and bent pipe commercial satellite; provide 
initial product exploitation and disseminate directly to the warfighter.39 
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Figure 8. CET Organization Chart40 
From the Battalion and Brigade mission statements and their respective unit 
organizations, 1st Space Brigade and 1st Space Battalion identified and developed critical 
tasks which ensure and enable mission success.  These critical tasks are called Mission 
Essential Task Lists (METL).   METL tasks are not developed for Army units below 
battalion level.  The 1st Space Brigade METL follows: 
Provide Space Support 
Provide Space Control 
Provide Space Force Enhancement 
Conduct Theater-Wide Information Operations (IO) 
Protect Ground Based Space Assets  
Deploy (Proposed)41 
The 1st Space Battalion METL follows: 
Deploy and redeploy Battalion Space Forces 
 Command and Control Battalion Space Forces 
Provide continuous assured Theater Ballistic Missile Warning, Combined 
 Early Warning, and Battlespace Characterization 
Plan, coordinate, integrate and synchronize execution of Space Force       
  Enhancement Functions 
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Sustain deployed Battalion Space Forces 
Conduct Space Control and Information Operations 
Protect the Force42 
It is important to note that both the Battalion and Brigade METL contain 
Information Operations.  At brigade level, there is a break in METL traceability with 
respect to Information Operations.  The Brigade METL lists theater-wide IO support but 
IO is not yet part of their mission statement.  The SMDC/ARSTART mission does 
include Information Operations but neither Joint nor Army Space doctrinal publications 
identify IO as a space mission area.  The Battalion Mission and METL are consistent in 
their inclusion of IO but this Battalion METL task cannot be traced to parent organization 
mission statements or doctrinal references.   
The mission area of IO is being directed to SMDC by STRATCOM and is a new 
development within the past 18 months.  STRATCOM tasked SMDC/ARSTRAT to be 
the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) for the mission areas of space, IO, 
global strike, integrated missile defense, and command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR).  The STRATCOM 
organizational alignment of Joint Force Component Commands, addressed in subsequent 
paragraphs, resulted in SMDC assuming ASCC responsibilities in these numerous 
mission areas.  The inclusion of IO in the Space Brigade and Battalion METL can be 
traced to these recent changes to the STRATCOM roles, responsibilities and mission 
areas.  Subsequent revision of the Brigade mission statement will contain the IO mission 
area. 
The STRATCOM mission changes came from decisions made at the highest 
levels of DoD and the government.  President Bush made significant changes to the 
Unified Command Plan (UCP) in 2002.  The biggest change was the merger of the 
United States Space Command (SPACECOM) with the United States Strategic 
Command (STRATCOM).  STRATCOM was activated on 1 October 2002. This merger  
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resulted in an expanded STRATCOM “which is now responsible for Space operations, 
information operations, computer network operations and strategic defense and attack 
missions.”43   
In January 2003, the President signed Change Two to the UCP.  STRATCOM 
received four new areas of responsibility from Change Two to the UCP.  The previously 
unassigned mission areas are Global Strike, Missile Defense Integration, Department of 
Defense Information Operations and C4ISR. “The merger improves combat effectiveness 
and speeds up information collection and assessment needed for strategic decision 
making.  The merged command will be responsible for both early warning of and defense 
against missile attacks as well as long-range strategic attacks.”44   
STRATCOM divided responsibility for its four mission areas among Joint Force 
Component Commands (JFCC).  They are JFCC-Integrated Missile Defense (IMD), 
JFCC-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), JFCC-Space & Global Strike 
(S&GS) and JFCC-Network Warfare (NW).  STRATCOM designated 
SMDC/ARSTRAT the JFCC-IMD.  The Air Force provides the JFCC-S&GS. The 
United States Strategic Command mission statement is: 
Provide the nation with global deterrence capabilities and synchronized 
DoD effects to combat adversary weapons of mass destruction worldwide.  
Enable decisive global kinetic and non-kinetic combat effects through the 
application and advocacy of integrated intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR); space and global strike operations; information 
operations; integrated missile defense and robust command and control.45 
The assigned mission areas in STRATCOM that fall under the JFCC-S&GS are Nuclear 
Deterence, Space Operations, Global Strike and IO.  IO is a shared mission area with the 
JFCC-NW.   
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As the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) for JFCC-SGS, 
SMDC/ARSTRAT’s mission and force structure will similarly expand and adjust to meet 
the new roles responsibilities.  The IO mission area is the biggest change to the previous 
mission focus of the earlier SMDC/ARSPACE organization and is the most problematic 
because of manning and expertise concerns.  The scope of the newly assigned duties as 
the Army’s lead planner, integrator, and coordinator for IO in STRATCOM will take a 
great deal of time to progress, mature and man. 
This is problematic in the defined roles and responsibilities of Army Space 
Operations.  The Functional Area 40 officer or Space Operations Officer emerged to 
provide space expertise to the warfighter and to enable designated FA40 officers a career 
path that facilitated mission expertise development and use.  The Army similarly 
designated a functional area officer group, FA30 or Information Operations Officer, as  
the cadre group responsible for IO.  Many aspects of the Space Brigade and Battalion 
Mission and METL, if not all, involve IO, but SMDC and the Army Space community is 
not the proponent for IO.   
The expanding Space mission area provides more than adequate challenges and 
workloads for the low density FA40 Space cadre.  The FA40 missions are already 
experiencing contested overlap areas with other Army communities, such as the 
Communications and Intelligence branches and IO will contribute more areas of conflict.  
Almost any activity on the battlefield can be considered Information Operations.  The 
direct impact of space control, force enhancement and many other space activities will 
result in IO objectives.  Establishing SMDC as the Army lead to STRATCOM for IO will 
require increases in force structure, equipment and manning of the Space Brigade and 
Battalion.  Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) and doctrine will also have to be developed 
to mesh IO activities into space operations. 
D. ARMY SPACE MISSION AREAS: DOCTRINE AND POLICY LINKAGES  
Army Space doctrine is derived from Joint Publication 3-14 (JP 3-14), Joint 
Doctrine for Space Operations, and from National, Joint and Service policy.  The latest 
revision of JP3-14 was signed and published in August 2002.  Army space doctrine is 
described and defined in Field Manual 3-14 (FM 3-14), Space Support to Army 
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Operations. FM 3-14 identifies the same four mission areas of Space Operations as in JP 
3-14.  These Space Operations mission areas are Space Support, Force Application, Force 
Enhancement and Space Control.  “These are all actions that contribute to using space to 
dominate the battlefield and ensure superiority.  Army space operations consist of those 
activities concerned with controlling and exploiting space to enhance land warfighting.”46 
Space support is defined by Joint Pub 3-14 as activities that “launch, deploy, 
augment, maintain, sustain, replenish, deorbit, and recover space forces, including the C2 
network configuration for space operations.”  The space support mission area is further  
defined by its two functions; spacelift, deorbiting and recovery, and satellite operations. 
Satellite operations are those actions taken to provide telemetry, tracking and 
commanding (TT&C) for satellites.47  
Army doctrine clearly states that space support is primarily an Air Force and DoD 
Space Executive Agent mission.  However, the Army is responsible for the Defense 
Satellite Communications System’s (DSCS) payload and network control and has backup 
contingency control capability to the Air Force for DSCS bus operations. 
The Force Application mission area is not considered a current activity by Army 
doctrine but a “potential mission of the future.”48  Joint doctrine defines this mission area 
in JP 3-14:  
The application of force would consist of attacks against terrestrial-based 
targets carried out by military weapon systems operating in or through 
space.  The force application mission area includes ballistic missile 
defense and force projection.49 
The Army doctrine acknowledges ballistic missile defense (BMD) weapon 
systems as force application platforms, but does not elaborate on BMD doctrine within 
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FM 3-14.  BMD systems and ICBMs are the only current DoD force application systems.  
This is a mission area that needs more accurate definition in Joint and Service doctrine.  
Ballistic trajectories that pass through the space medium should not be considered Force 
Application if the missile or projectile’s target is terrestrial and no space maneuvers 
occur.   
The Force Enhancement mission area consists of “those operations that multiply 
joint force effectiveness by enhancing battlespace awareness and providing needed 
warfare support.”  These Force Enhancement activities improve the lethality of all 
Service forces and are conducted by the DoD, other government agencies and 
commercial companies. Joint Doctrine identifies five Force Enhancement functions:  
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); integrated tactical warning and 
attack assessment; environmental monitoring; communications; and position, velocity, 
time and navigation (PVNT). 50   
The Army has long claimed that as a Service, it is the largest user of space.  This 
statement is based upon the huge number of GPS receivers and SATCOM terminals in 
the Army.  Because of the Army’s large and ever increasing reliance on space-based 
products and services, the Service focuses its Space Operations activities on Force 
Enhancement functions.  Those Force Enhancement functions detailed in JP 3-14 are 
consistently represented in FM 3-14.  Within the Army, there is much contention between 
the communications and space communities as to who has responsibility.  The Army 
Signal Corps see SATCOM as just another piece in an Army and Joint communications 
architecture.  The Army space community believes that SATCOM is a large part of why 
the FA40 career field was developed and thus their mission area.    
In support of the Communications function of Force Enhancement, 
SMDC/ARSTRAT has operational control (OPCON) of the three Regional Satellite 
Support Centers (RSSC), and contributes personnel to operate the USSTRATCOM-
operated Global Satellite Support Center (GSCC).  The RSCC facilities plan and manage 
global communications for the warfighting commands.  Regional Combatant Commands 
                                                 
50 Joint Publication 3-14: Joint Doctrine for Space Operations.  IV-8. 
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coordinate UHF, SHF, EHF and commercial satellite communications support through 
their respective RSSC sites.  The GSCC performs the same support activities for Unified 
Commands and other agencies that do not have an assigned RSCC. 














Table 1. Satellite Support Center Matrix51 
 
 
Figure 9. RSCC Site Map52 
SMDC/ARSTRAT also has the responsibility of SATCOM system expert for the 
Wideband Gapfiller System SHF satellites.  These Wideband Gapfiller satellites will 
augment the DSCS constellation when the constellation is in orbit. 
                                                 
51 Field Manual 3-14: Space Support to Army Operations. B-4.  
52 Field Manual 3-14: Space Support to Army Operations. B-5. 
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The Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation provides the Services with 
precise location and timing data.  The GPS location data enables use of precision guided 
munitions, high speed maneuver by air and ground assets and Blue Force Tracking of 
friendly assets to maximize C2 and battlespace awareness.  The GPS constellation 
provides the data but the Army space professional has the mission of incorporating, 
leveraging, and maximizing the effects of PVNT data in warfighting operations. 
Environmental monitoring is the use of space-based sensors to produce valuable 
meteorological and space environmental data.  This Force Enhancement function 
supports warfighters by improving Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and  
allowing commanders on the ground to avoid areas that present an environmental 
disadvantage to operations.  All Services have an interest in the Environmental 
Monitoring function of the Force Enhancement mission area. 
The ISR function of Force Enhancement mission area is defined as “the 
monitoring of terrestrial Areas of Interest from space to help reveal location, disposition, 
and intention of tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.”53  ISR also has a battle 
damage assessment (BDA) component which is critical to battlefield situational 
awareness. As with SATCOM, the Army has two different segments of the Service that 
believes space-based ISR is their responsibility.  The Army’s intelligence and space 
communities both see this function as their responsibility within the Service.  In fact, FM 
3-14 states that “space-based ISR is one component of the seamless ISR enterprise.”54  
Both communities have doctrinal claims to and pursue activities in the ISR function of 
Force Enhancement. 
The Early Warning function of Force Enhancement is the detection and 
dissemination of information regarding an enemy’s use of ballistic missiles at the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.  All Services have a role in this function.  
Within the Army, the space and missile defense communities share the lead role in Early  
                                                 
53 Joint Publication 3-14: Joint Doctrine for Space Operations. IV-8. 
54 Field Manual 3-14: Space Support to Army Operations. 2-7.  
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Warning within the Space and Missile Defense Command.  The dual nature of the 
MACOM precludes the open disagreement of who should have the Army’s lead for Early 
Warning. 
The Space Control mission area is defined in Joint doctrine as those actions 
providing unrestricted use and access of space and space-based assets by friendly forces 
and denying an adversary access to the same.  JP 3-14 breaks down the Space Control 
mission area into four functions.  These Space Control functions or missions are  
Protection, Prevention, Surveillance and Negation.  The ultimate goal of the Space 
Control mission is to “gain and maintain space superiority and situational awareness of 
events that impact space operations.”55   
 
Figure 10. Space Control Missions56                                                  
55 Joint Publication 3-14: Joint Doctrine for Space Operations. IV-6.  
56 Joint Publication 3-14: Joint Doctrine for Space Operations. IV-6. 
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The Army, sensitive to the possibility of being forced out of the Space Control 
mission area by the Air Force, quotes JP 3-14 in Field Manual 3-14; “The Army is to 
provide space control operations and space support to the Joint force…”  The newly 
developed Army Space Policy signed in 2003 is also cited and is the first Service 
document that formally states the Army’s intention to actively pursue ground-based space 
control capabilities.   
 
Figure 11. Space Control Matrix57 
The Army’s FM 3-14 differs slightly from the Joint space doctrine.  The Army 
doctrine identifies “five interrelated objectives”.  The Army Space Control objectives 
identified in FM 3-14 are: 
Surveillance of space to be aware of the presence of space assets and to  
 understand real-time satellite mission operations.    
Protect U.S. and friendly space systems from hostile actions.   
Prevent unauthorized access to, and exploitation of, space systems.   
Negate hostile space systems that place our interests at risk.   
Directly support battle management, command, control, communications,  
 and intelligence.58  
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This is a subtle difference between the Army and Joint doctrinal publications.  Army 
doctrine directly links Space Control activities to overall battle management, C2 and 
communications.  The reason for that difference appears in subsequent paragraphs of FM 
3-14: 
Therefore any accomplishment of space control whether it is protecting 
our own space assets, preventing unauthorized use of our assets, negating 
those of the adversary, or even simply surveiling assets to note their 
location and function, affects information.  Operations to change the state 
of information, whether it is gaining more for our use or denying it to the 
adversary, can be related to information operations.59  
The Army Space community has thus established a doctrinal basis to formally 
take an expanding Information Operations role within the Service, and it has formalized 
the Service commitment to Space Control in doctrine and policy.  
Joint Publication 3-14, Doctrine for Joint Space Operations establishes four Space 
Mission areas.  Those mission areas are Force Enhancement, Force Application, Space 
Support and Space Control.  From those core mission areas the Army developed space 
capabilities or functions: communications; intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance 
(ISR); missile defense; weather, terrain and environmental monitoring (WTEM); 
position, velocity navigation and timing (PVNT).  These capabilities can be traced not 
only to Joint Publication 3-14, Doctrine for Joint Space Operations, but also to early 
Army space doctrinal publication and policies such as TRADOC Pamphlet (TP) 525-60, 
Operations Concept, Space Support to Land Forces Operations and the 1993 Army Space 
Policy. The Secretary of the Army approved the first iteration of Army Space doctrine, 
Field Manual (FM) 100-18, Space Support to Army Operations, in 1993. 
In 2003, TP 525-60 was replaced by TP 525-3-14, Concept for Space Operations 
in Support of the Objective Force.  Building upon JP 3-14 and FM 100-18, TP 525-3-14 
built upon the four mission areas of Space Support, Force Enhancement, Force 
Application and Space Control.  The Army identified specific space functions within the 
four space mission areas.  
                                                 
58 Field Manual 3-14: Space Support to Army Operations. 2-12. 




Figure 12. Space Operations Mission Areas60 
In April 2003, the Secretary of the Army signed the new Army Space Policy.  The 
new Space Policy formally tied space to Army Transformation.  “Space is inherently 
Joint and full operational integration of Space with Land, Air, Sea, and Information 
capabilities is necessary to achieve the Army’s Transformational Objectives, an integral 
part of Department of Defense (DoD) Transformation, and the Army Vision.”61 
The new Army Space Policy restated the FM 100-18 space capabilities, but also 
added a new element (listed in bold): 
Responsive, dynamic, space based-intelligence, surveillance, and 
 reconnaissance sensors networked with land, sea, air, and soldier 
 sensors… 
Seamlessly integrated, dynamic bandwidth, satellite communications  
 (SATCOM) on-the-move… 
                                                 
60 U. S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Concept for Space Operations in Support of 
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33 
Assured, accurate, real-time missile warning and tracking distributed  
 direct to affected forces and battle command systems… 
Precise, redundant, jam resistant; position, velocity, navigation, and timing 
 services… 
Advanced sensors for timely, tailorable weather, terrain, and   
 environmental monitoring… 
Responsive, tactically relevant Space Control capabilities   
 synchronized and integrated with Land, Sea, Air, and   
 Information Operations...62 
The original Army-advocated space capabilities; ISR, communications, WETM, 
PVNT and missile warning; were expanded to include space control.  At no other time 
has the Army openly acknowledged in policy that the Service would pursue space control 
capabilities. 
The Army’s functions are expanded to include the following: Operate 
select spacecraft and spacecraft systems; Organize, train, equip, and 
provide forces for Army and Joint Space Operations; Develop Army 
doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment employed by 
Army and Joint forces in conduct of Space Operations; Interdict enemy 
space power through operations on or from land; Participate with other 
Service in Joint Space Support Operations when directed.63  
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-14 went before an Army Requirements Oversight 
Council (AROC) in January 2003.  The purpose of the AROC briefing was to gain Chief 
of Staff, Army (CSA) approval of the draft TP525-3-14 and the identified Army Space 
Operations Essential Tasks.  The proposed Space Operations Essential Tasks were:   
Support increased deployability and reduced theater footprint 
Enable situational understanding “Off the Ramp” during entry operations 
Support precision maneuver, fires, sustainment and information   
Enable continuous information and decision superiority 
Protect the force during all phases of the operation.64 
The CSA approved the TP 525-3-14 document and the Space Operations 
Essential Tasks.  The new Army Space Policy was signed into effect shortly thereafter in 
April 2003.  In April 2005, the CSA signed FM3-14, Space Support to Army Operations.   
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From these existing doctrine and policy documents, ARSTRAT developed the mission 
statements for the 1st Space Brigade and the 1st Space Battalion that were covered in the 
earlier sections of this chapter.  
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III. THE ARMY AND TRANSFORMATION 
A. OVERVIEW 
The Army is currently undergoing a Transformation process.  The final output of 
this Army Transformation process is an Objective Force.  All Battlefield Operating 
Systems and combat enablers must be embedded in the Transformation process and the 
Objective Force.  This chapter will present the driving factors behind Army 
Transformation and the Objective Force.  If Space is not part of the Objective Force, it 
will not be a relevant Army mission area and the value of the existing space forces and 
the space operations officers will be questionable.      
It is paramount to understand how Transformation is affecting the basic Army 
organizations if one is to know how space expertise can be leveraged to help these 
organizations.  New terms such as Units of employment and Units of Action have 
emerged and the concept of modularity is being applied to warfighting organizations. 
The end state of the Army’s Transformation, the Objective Force, will be based 
upon Units of Employment and Units of Action.  Units of Employment will have two 
levels, “x”, the lower level, and “y”, the higher level.  The Army Divisions are being 
reorganized as Units of Employment (UEx) and brigades are being reorganized as Units 
of Action (UA).  Corps and higher units are Units of Employment at the “y” level (UEy). 
The focus of Army Transformation is to create a smaller, more responsive 
command structure that will tailor its combat forces to meet the existing threat and 
environment in the area of operation.  Developing modular building blocks of combat 
power allows a command element to build the force structure needed for the mission 
requirements and to leave out building blocks not needed.  This is in contrast to the 
Legacy Divisions of the 1990s that had large standing force structures and created a non-
responsive, cumbersome combat unit.  These Legacy Divisions required large amounts of 
time to deploy, reassemble in the area of operation, and conduct combat operations.  
Transformation will streamline the deployment process and put a tailored force package 
on the ground in a much shorter period of time.  Army Transformation is all about 
increasing responsiveness, lethality and agility. 
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If Army space operators are to play a key role in the Transformed Army and the 
Objective Force, they must be embedded in the force structure development process.  
Placing space elements in the Objective Force organizations must occur if the Space 
mission area is to become a normalized component of Army operations.  Chapters III and 
IV will address the decisions that the Army Space community must make in positioning 
space operators in the Objective Force construct.  The impact of Joint Transformation and 
Joint Vision documents will flow into the Army’s Transformation process.  Chapter III 
will also identify the space capabilities that are being provided to the Objective Force, 
who will provide them, and at what unit level they will occur.  
B. UNITS OF ACTION AND UNITS OF EMPLOYMENT 
The Army is in the midst of a dynamic transformation process that will enhance 
Service support to Joint combat operations and Army-unique warfighting needs.  “The 
United States Army has adopted a revolutionary transformation strategy to field a future 
Objective Force that is strategically responsive and dominant across the full spectrum of 
military operations.”65  Army Transformation will make the Service lighter, faster, more 
lethal and more relevant in responding to Joint, Interagency and Multinational (JIM) 
operations.  The goal of this transformational change in the Army is the Objective Force. 
The main effort of transformation is the Objective Force.  The Objective 
Force is our future full spectrum force:  organized, manned, equipped, and 
trained to be more strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, 
lethal, survivable, and sustainable across the entire spectrum of military 
operations from major theater wars through counter terrorism to homeland 
security.  Army Objective Force units will dominate land operations, 
providing the decisive complement to air, sea, and space operations.66     
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Figure 13. The Army Objective Force67 
Army Transformation is directly linked to Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) 
operational concepts. The Joint concepts and capabilities that are under development by 
the Joint Staff, combatant commanders and Services are the “engines of change for the 
development of future military capabilities.”68  The original JV 2010 concepts or goals 
were Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional Protection and 
Focused Logistics.  These four JV2010 concepts when fused with Information 
Superiority enable Full Spectrum Dominance.   
These JV2010 concepts have evolved into a framework that is comprised of 
overarching Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC), Joint Operating Concepts (JOC), Joint 
Functional Concepts and Joint Integrating Concepts (JIC).  The overarching JOpsC are 
the descriptors of Joint Force operations in 20 years and the foundation of all Joint and 
                                                 
67 Association of the U.S. Army Transformation Panel, “Army Transformation Briefing,” 
(Washington, D.C.: 2000), 4-1. 
68 Department of the Army, 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap. (Washington, D.C.: US 
Government Printing Office, 2004), 2-4.    
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Service Transformation.    The JOCs are the basis for the future Joint Force commanders 
planning, preparation and execution of Joint operations.  The JOCs are Homeland 
Security (HLS), Strategic Deterrence (SD), Major Combat Operations (MCO) and 
Stability Operations (SO).69 The JOCs are not separate mission areas but rather 
interrelated, evolving concepts that focus all Services’ Transformation efforts.  From 
these JOCs the Army derives the required capabilities to support JIM operations.  Space 
does not fall into the category of a JOpsC, JOC, or JFC.  Space is an enabler for all of 
these categories. 
 
Figure 14. Joint Concepts from Joint Vision 201070 
Army Transformation and the Objective Force can be traced to Joint Vision 2010 
and the evolving Joint Operating Concepts through Army Vision 2010.  Army Vision 
2010 sets the stage for Transformation by stating, “We must lighten up the heavy forces 
and heavy up the light forces.”  Army Vision 2010 takes the four JV2010 concepts listed 
                                                 
69 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, 2-6 - 2-8. 
70 Ibid., 2-3. 
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in the preceding page and identifies six patterns of operation.  These patterns of operation 
are Project the Force, Sustain the Force, Decisive Operations, Shape the Battlespace, 
Protect the Force and Gain Information Dominance.  As with the Joint Concepts, the 
Army identifies Space as a key enabler for these patterns of operation. 
Five of these patterns of operation align precisely with the Joint Vision 
2010 operational concepts of Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, 
Focused Logistics and Full Dimensional Protection.  The sixth, Gaining 
Information Dominance, is fundamental to each of the other five Army 
patterns of operation as well as each of the operational concepts in Joint 
Vision 2010.71 
Within the Army all development of doctrine, concepts and capabilities must be 
directly linked to Army Transformation and the Objective Force.  If Space is to evolve as 
an acknowledged, key Army enabler, it must be embedded in the Objective Force 
framework.  Until technology advancements in force enhancement systems improve and 
space awareness levels increase, this means embedding space personnel.  The Army is 
transforming based upon the ever changing global environment and emerging threats.  
“America is a nation at war.  Peace can no longer be viewed as the default condition. Nor 
war as the exception.  The Army is transforming for continuous operations as a 
campaign-quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities.”72  This new strategic 
reality is defined by: 
A conflict of irreconcilable ideas 
A disparate pool of potential combatants 
Adaptive adversaries seeking our destruction by any means possible 
Evolving asymmetric threats that will relentlessly seek shelter in those  
 environments and methods for which the nation is least prepared 
A foreseeable future of extended conflict in which the Army can expect to  
 fight every day and in which real peace will be the anomaly73 
 Army Transformation will restructure the existing, Division-centric Army 
organization (Legacy Forces) and create adaptable, modular force packages that do not 
have huge command and control or support structures.  The bridge between the Objective 
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72 Ibid., 2.  
73 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, 1-1. 
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Force and the Legacy Force will be a mix of new systems and capabilities as well as re-
capitalized legacy systems, the Interim Force.  The standard for the transformed Army is 
to be able to deploy a brigade sized unit anywhere in the world within “96 hours after 
‘wheels up’ of the first aircraft, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions 
in theater in 30 days.”74 
The Transformed Army or Objective Force is based upon seven capabilities.  The 
Objective Force capabilities are Responsiveness, Deployability, Agility, Versatility, 
Lethality, Survivability, and Sustainability.   To accomplish this transformation, the 
Objective Force must have the current lethality and staying power of the Army’s armor 
and mechanized divisions while maintaining the flexible deployability of light divisions: 
The Army will retain heavy force lethality through overmatch while 
giving it deployability and employability in areas currently accessible only 
by light forces.  The Army Transformation seeks to produce a general-
purpose Objective Force capable of meeting all these operational demands 
through an operational and organizational concept that reconciles the 
unchanging nature of war and the changing conduct of war.75 
From these Army patterns of operation and objective Force capabilities, the Army 
has identified six Transformation priorities.  The Transformation priorities are Increased 
Deployability, Reduced Footprint, Situational Understanding Off the Ramp, Information 
and Decision Superiority, Force Protection, and Precision Fires and Maneuver.  Again, 
Space is an enabler for these priorities, not a priority unto itself. 
The Army used a Gap Analysis methodology in the Transformation process to 
determine the capability shortcomings of the current forces and the evolving Objective 
Force.  These gaps are directly linked to the Joint Operations Concepts from JV2010 and 
Army Vision 2010.  The output from the analysis is not capabilities but rather capability 
gaps.  As a critical enabler, Space operations can highlight its value to the Joint and the 
Army warfighters by linking the Gap Analysis findings with Space capabilities.  
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Figure 15. Army Transformation Gap Analysis76 
For Army Space operations to be relevant in the Objective Force, space 
capabilities must provide a solution that can bridge these Service gaps.  Army Space 
doctrine, requirements, systems, capabilities and force structure must address these Army 
shortfalls if space is to transform with the Objective Force.77  Space is valuable to the 
Objective Force for the capabilities the mission area provides, but aligning space 
capabilities with Army capability gaps highlights the mission area’s enabling 
characteristics.  The Army space community has identified space solutions to ten critical 
Army capability gaps.  Table 2 shows the Army shortfalls and corresponding space 
capabilities that could bridge the gaps. 
Army Capability Gap Space Capabilities 
Enhance Soldier Protection Missile Warning, Space Control 
Provide Effective Command and Control SATCOM; Joint Blue Force Situational 
Awareness (JBFSA); Position, Velocity, 
Navigation and Timing (PVNT) 
Enhance Platform Protection Missile Warning, Space Control  
Provide Dynamic, Uninterrupted C4 
Architecture 
SATCOM, JBFSA 
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Provide Modular, Tailorable Forces Army Space Forces  
Provide Capability for Lethal Overmatch SATCOM, JBFSA, PVNT 
Enable the Army to Train as it Fights Modeling and Simulation, SATCOM, 
JBFSA, PVNT 
Provide Superior Intelligence Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capabilities 
ISR, Weather Terrain Environmental 
Monitoring (WTEM) 
Provide Capabilities to Detect and Identify 
Obstacles 
ISR, WTEM 
Provide Logistics to Sustain Modular Force SATCOM, PVNT 
Table 2. Army Capability Gaps and Space Enablers/Solutions78 
These identified Space enablers to Army capability gaps set the foundation on 
which to establish Army Space priorities.  The Space priorities resulting from this process 
are: 
1. Seamless integrated, dynamic bandwidth for Battle Command on the 
 move 
2. Responsive, tactically relevant Space Control capabilities synchronized 
 and integrated with Land, Sea, Air and Information Operations 
3. Assured, accurate real time missile warning and tracking distributed 
 directly to affected forces and battle command systems 
4. Precise, redundant, jam-resistant PVNT services 
5. Advanced sensors for timely, tailorable WTEM79  
Without this traceable link to Army Transformation Capabilities and Gaps, Army 
space capabilities and forces will not be accepted as a critical Objective Force enabler.  
C. TRANSFORMING ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMAND LEVELS  
Army Transformation will break down the Legacy Force construct which focused 
on the Army divisions.  Following the first Gulf War the Army underwent a downsizing 
from 18 divisions to its current 10 divisions.  There are currently four Army Corps’ and 
two numbered Armies (see Figure 16).   
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Figure 16. The Army Structure Prior to Transformation80 
A Legacy division is made up of three maneuver brigades, an artillery brigade, an 
engineer brigade, an aviation brigade and a variety of other support units.  All told, a 
Legacy division is made up of 10,000 to 18,000 soldiers depending on if it is a heavy or 
light unit (See Figure 17).  When deployed to a theater of operation, the division strength 
doubles to roughly 30,000 with all of its sustainment augmentation.  In subsequent 
figures in this chapter, note that “XXXX” is the symbol for a numbered Army, “XXX” is 
the symbol for a Corps, “XX” for a Division and “X” for a Brigade. 
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Figure 17. Army Legacy Division81 
The primary component of the Legacy division is the brigade.  Legacy brigades 
are composed of 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers and have unique equipment and capabilities.  At 
the heart of Army Transformation is conversion of legacy brigades to Brigade Combat 
Teams/Units of Action (BCT/UA) and tailoring the UAs under a smaller, more efficient 
command structure at the UEx and UEy echelons.  These modular UAs will be the 
building blocks for the Objective Force Units of Employment in contrast to the division-
centric Legacy Force.   
The decisive effort of Army transformation is the creation of modular, 
combined arms maneuver Brigade Combat Teams (Units of Action), or 
BCT (UA).  As part of this transformation, the Army migrates capabilities 
that were previously found at Division and Corps to the UA – the building 
block of combat forces in the Objective Force.82 
The Legacy Force was not able to adapt its warfighting elements without adding 
non-organic forces or leaving behind organic units.  Tailoring a Legacy Division required 
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an intensive overhaul of the Division’s existing structure and a great deal of time.  
Transformation focuses on building flexible, “plug-and-play” brigades/UAs that can be 
quickly packaged under a UEx command headquarters without losing effectiveness and 
lethality.   
 
Figure 18. Transformation Shift to Brigade-Centric Construct83 
Army Transformation will drastically change two aspects of its fighting forces – 
the command level structure and the primary warfighting organizations, the brigades.  
This paper will discuss the transforming command structures within the Army first.  The 
command levels prior to Transformation are Division, Corps and Echelons above Corps 
(EAC) or Army-level (See Figure 19).  Note that the Army uses UA, Brigade and BCT as 
interchangeable terms, UEx and Division as interchangeable terms, and UEy will be 
interchangeable with Corps, Army or Army Service Component to a Combatant  
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Command. Transformation will reduce the number of general officer command levels 
from three to two as shown in Figure 19.  The UAs or BCTs will usually be commanded 
by a Colonel.   
1. Units of Employment 
Divisions, Corps and Armies command structures will be converted to Units of 
Employment (UE) in the Objective Force.  There are two levels of UE.  Division 
headquarters will be converted to UEx command elements and Corps and Echelons above 
Corps (EAC) headquarters will be converted to UEy command elements. A 2-star general 
will normally command the UEx organizations, consistent with the Legacy Division 
Command rank.  A 3-star or 4-star general will command the UEy which is consistent 
with the Corps and EAC command rank.  “The echelons are currently designated UEx, 
which normally has tactical and operational control of units of action, and UEy, which 
normally provides the Army’s functional capabilities to the Joint Force Commander.”84 
 
Figure 19. The Transformed Army Command Echelons85  
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The UEx and UEy command elements are standing headquarters, much smaller 
than the pre-Transformational headquarters at Division, Corps and EAC.  These new 
modular headquarters will command tailored force packages.  The tailored force 
packages commanded by the UEx and UEy are made up of modular brigades to meet a 
specific regional threat or mission challenge. The modular brigades are called Brigade 
Combat Teams or Units of Action (UA) in Transformation terminology.  
The UEy command echelon is a “concept under development for an Army 
theater-level headquarters to support regional combatant commanders.”86The UEy 
command structure combines the current Corps and Army Service Component 
Commands and numbered Armies.  
Figure 20 shows the UEy command organization, the sequence of numbers refers 
to the number of officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers and NCOs, and the total 
number of personnel within each element.  An example is the “INTEL” block at the 
bottom left of Figure 20 which reads “29/13/26=68” which represents 29 officers, 13 
warrant officers and 26 enlisted soldiers and NCOs for a total of 68 personnel in the Intel 
section of the UEy.   
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Figure 20. UEy Functional Organization Chart87 
 “The UEy would focus on the Army’s component responsibilities for the entire 
theater’s JIM operational land forces.  During major combat operations, where the 
regional combatant commander is the Joint Force Commander, the UEy would normally 
become the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) and exercise operational 
control over tactical land forces.”88  The UEy command echelon is still in the concept 
development phase, but UEx conversion has already begun.   
“The UEx is the Army’s primary tactical and operational warfighting 
headquarters.  It is designed as a modular, command and control headquarters for full 
spectrum operations.”89  The UEx is an operational level headquarters with full Joint 
connectivity whereas the Division headquarters was strictly a tactical command echelon 
with very little Joint operations connectivity.  The UEx command structure design is 
shown in Figure 21.  
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Figure 21. A Transformed UEx Command Echelon90 
UEx headquarters are already in place, transforming the 3rd Infantry Division, 
101st Airborne Division, 4th Infantry Division and the 10th Mountain Division.  These 
new UEx headquarters command and control up to six maneuver brigades or UAs, 
compared to the Legacy Division construct which had a rigid three-brigade organization.  
An example of a UEx force package is shown in Figure 22.  These brigades/UAs are the 
focus of Transformation with respect to the second aspect of Transformation – the 
warfighting units’ force structure; just as the Division, Corps and EAC headquarters 
where the focus for transforming command and control echelons. 
                                                 
90 The Army Modular Force Brief, 20. 
50 
 
Figure 22. Example of a UEx Force Package91 
2. Units of Action 
The transformed brigade combat teams (BCT) or UA will have roughly 4,000 
soldiers, a standardized headquarters and a modular self-contained structure.  This is 
much different from the legacy division where brigades rely on divisional assets for 
support and divisions have unique support and command relations that make deviation 
from “normal” deployment very difficult.   Transformation is about developing modular, 
self-contained brigade building blocks - the UA’s, and tailoring the UEs based upon the 
specific needs of a supported regional Combatant Commander.  A UEx would have a 
standard and greatly reduced headquarters structure which could adapt the necessary 
number and type of UAs into a flexible fighting force capable of rapidly adapting to meet 
the unique threat and environmental challenges of the Regional Combatant Commanders.  
                                                 
91 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, 3-6. 
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Figure 23. Brigade Combat Teams (Units of Action, UA)92 
An example would be the current requirement for more Military Police (MP) units 
in Iraq while the need for artillery support has all but disappeared.  Under the legacy 
construct, a Division would deploy with its organic artillery and MP units.  Any change 
in their respective numbers through augmentations and additions would be done “on the 
fly” and would have many support and command and control (C2) problems associated 
with such a change.  Under the Transformational construct, a UE command element 
would be assigned functional UA’s based upon the operations requirements, not on a 
rigid organic structure.  These UA’s would be designed to quickly plug into the UE 
command structure and immediately execute their assigned tasks with a reduced 
dependency on the UE for support due to their self-contained nature.  If more MP units 
were required, additional MP UAs would be assigned to the UE and unneeded artillery 
UAs would not be apportioned. 
D. SPACE SUPPORT TO THE TRANSFORMED ARMY 
The focus of Army Transformation on Joint operations affects all functional areas 
including Space.  Although space has been formally recognized as an inherently joint 
mission area for decades, the nature of Army Space is also forced to change with 
                                                 
92 The Army Modular Force Brief, 8. 
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Transformation.  The most prominent evidence of this transformation of Army space is in 
the emerging force structure corresponding to the UAs and UEs.  Where should Army 
Space operations personnel be located in the UA, UEx and UEy organizations?  Should 
space operators be a part of each?  Understanding a Transformed space support 
organization is dependent upon understanding past and existing space support units. 
The ARSSTs (Army Space Support Teams introduced in Chapter II) are part of 
the 1st Space Battalion in Colorado Springs and belong to the 2nd Space Company 
(ARSST).  The ARSSTs deployed throughout the 1990s to support Division 
(transforming to UEx) and Corps (transforming to UEy) headquarters in exercises and 
warfighting operations.  The ARSST teams are attached to a higher headquarters and 
deploy with that unit as needed – the ARSSTs are not organic to the UEx or UEy 
command echelons.  Because of Army Transformation, the method by which space 
support was provided began to shift to organic space support for tactical units (UEx and 
below) vice attached ARSST teams that were deployed in an ad hoc manner when needed 
to support a Corps or higher (UEy and above).  Army Transformation has caused a major 
change in the concept of space support and to Army space force structure.   
The goal is to keep pace with Army transformation processes.  The 
optimum end state may be to have special staff sections that are organic to 
land component commanders, corps commanders, and (potentially) 
division commanders.93 
This quote from the Army Space Master Plan (signed March 2000 by the 
Commander of SMDC) stated the need for organic space operations support at Division, 
Corps and Land Component Commander (LCC) levels – the transformed UEx and UEy 
command structures.  The Army Space Master Plan was a roadmap to normalize, 
operationalize and institutionalize Army space in the transforming Army.  The key to 
normalizing space is to create organic space elements in the tactical units, particularly the 
Divisions.94  Over the next several years this possibility became reality in the form of the 
Space Support Element (SSE). 
                                                 
93 Department of the Army, United States Army Space Master Plan. (Washington, D.C.: US 
Government Printing Office, 2000), 4-11.  
94 Army Space Master Plan. 2-23. 
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The original or objective construct of the SSE force structure is for a 6-man 
element.  SMDC established the SSE force structure in 2002 with a Force Design Update 
(FDU) which was submitted to the Department of the Army for Chief of Staff approval. 
Chapter IV will go into more depth on the SSE FDU.  The SSE was to be comprised of 
four FA40 Space operations Officers and two communications non-commissioned 
officers (NCO).   
The SSE members would be located in the UEx Main Command Post (CP), 
Tactical CP #1 and Tactical CP #2.  The CPs are part of the UEx Operations (G3) staff 
sections of the existing ten Divisions (four of which are now converted to the UEx 
construct).  The SSEs will be part of the UEx command headquarters unlike the ARSSTs 
that were attached or “farmed-out” from ARSTRAT in Colorado Springs to support 
various Service and Joint units.  The SSEs will be organic to their UEx.   
As Army Transformation proceeded and the UEy, UEx and UA concepts 
emerged, SMDC force developers also proposed that the SSEs be organic elements of the 
UEy.  Additional proposals were for Space Operations Officers to be organic to the Fires 
UA, Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) UA.  The ARSST 
teams also remain as augmentation space assets under ARSTRAT control to support 
contingency operations.  Redundant levels of organic space support will be in place at the 
UA, UEx and UEy if all of these proposed space force design actions are implemented.  
The ARSSTs are rapidly deployable teams that provide Space Force 
Enhancement support and Space Control awareness primarily at the Corps 
(UEy) level.  Regardless of the echelon, the teams deploy and integrate 
into the supported unit staff.  The ARSSTs single focus is to provide 
relevant, timely Space-based products and support that enhance the ability 
of the warfighter to dominate the battle space and engage the enemy 
decisively.95 
In December 2004, the Chief of Staff, Army decided that the SSE force structure 
identified in the FDU be decreased from six soldiers to two.  In February 2005, SMDC  
                                                 
95 Hotop, Dave. “Space Force Enhancement: Army Space Support Teams in OIF” The Army 
Space Journal, Special Edition, 52. 
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submitted an amended FDU which would authorize a force structure of four soldiers for 
the SSE.  This latest FDU has not yet been approved by the Chief of Staff, but UEx SSEs 
are currently being fielded as 4-man elements.    
Of the ten Legacy Divisions, three are now modularized in the BCT/UA structure.  
The 3rd Infantry Division, 10th Mountain Division and 101st Airborne Division have 
modularized BCTs and organic SSEs.  The total number of SSEs supporting UEx and 
UEy organizations will be twenty-seven in 2009.  Of those twenty-seven SSEs, nineteen 
will be active component elements and eight will be reserve component and National 
Guard elements.  Table 3 shows the schedule as of March 2005 for the SSE support 
fielding to the active duty UEs.   
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Table 3. UEx/UEy SSE Fielding Schedule96 
The modular structure of the UEs in Figure 23 shows two elements called the 
Fires UA and the Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Brigades.  
Combat developers within the Army Space community believe that Fires and RSTA UAs 
or Brigades are other organizations that could possibly require organic support from 
space operations personnel.  SMDC has proposed that one FA40 Space Operations  
                                                 
96 U. S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command FA40 Proponent Office, FA40 NPS 
Orientation Brief, (Washington, D.C.: 2005), 20. 
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Officer (SOO) be assigned to each Fires Brigade and two SOO’s and one non-
commissioned officer (NCO) be assigned to each RSTA Brigade.  This embeds space 
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IV. THE SPACE SUPPORT FORCE STRUCTURE 
A. OVERVIEW 
SMDC established Army Space force structure in the Objective Force through 
Force Design Updates.  This chapter identifies where the Army Space Support Elements 
will be located in the Units of Employment.  The debate within the Army continues, what 
will be the final strength of the Space Support Elements within the UEx?     
The space capabilities provided by the Space Support Elements will be shown in 
relation to Army mission areas.  Space-unique tasks, enhancing tasks and critical tasks of 
the Space Support Elements are presented in this chapter.  The personnel strength of the 
Space Support Element and the space tasks they are to perform are critical issues.  Do 
Space Support Elements provide unique products and services or do they simply enhance 
other staff element operations?  If they are a redundant capability, how many space 
operators should be dedicated to this segment of the Army’s space mission? 
B. SPACE SUPPORT FORCE STRUCTURE 
The USASMDC’s Directorate for Combat Development (DCD) designed the UEx 
SSE in 2003 as a 6-man element containing four Space Operations Officers and two non-
commissioned officers (NCO).  The vehicle for this SSE structure design to support the 
UEx is the Force Design Update (FDU).  DCD designed the UEx SSE at a manning level 
of six to provide around-the-clock space support, planning and operations at the UEx 
Tactical 1 (TAC1) Command Post (CP) and an embedded space support, planning and 
operations presence in the UEx Main CP and the Tactical 2 (TAC 2) CP.  The fourth UEx 
CP, the Mobile Command Group (MCG), has no dedicated SSE element in the FDU.  
The FDU manned the UEx Main CP with one Major; the TAC1 CP with one Lieutenant 
Colonel, one Major and one Staff Sergeant; and the TAC2 CP with one Major and one 
Staff Sergeant.  All of the officers in the SSE FDU are FA40s, Space Operations Officers 
(SOO).  The Staff Sergeants in the TAC1 CP and TAC2 CP are Senior SATCOM  
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Systems Operators – Maintainers, Signal Corps NCOs.  Figure 24 shows the SSE support 
to the UEx with a 6-man element.98  The SSE equipment set for the SSE’s CP support 
elements will be further addressed in Chapter VI. 
 
Figure 24. SSE Support to UEx 99 
The FA40 Major located in the Main CP is the SSE’s primary planner, working 
with Main CP’s Plans Division in both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes.  
He prepares the Space Annex, Annex N, for the UEx Operations Plans and Orders and 
the space estimate.  He will also assist the G2 in conducting Intelligence Preparation of 
the Battlefield (IPB) and provide the G2 with the space segment for the IPB.100  Figure 25 
shows the personnel, equipment and a list of functions (not all-inclusive) that the FA40  
                                                 
98 United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command.  Operational and Organizational 
Concept Paper for the Space Support Element (SSE) in the Unit of Employment x (UEx). (Washington, 
D.C.: 2005), 6-9. 
99 Ibid., 9. 
100 Ibid., 6. 
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may perform at the Main CP.  The SSE element in the Main CP cannot support 24-hour 
operations, nor does it have the network connectivity possessed by the TAC 1 and TAC 2 
SSE element. 
 
Figure 25. SSE Support to UEx CPs101 
The TAC 1 and TAC 2 CPs are designed to perform the same functions.  
However, because the UEx’s primary staff members reside in the TAC 1 CP, the SSE 
element in the TAC 1 CP is designed to support 24-hour operations, and is thus manned 
with three personnel including the FA40 Lieutenant Colonel.  The TAC 2 CP usually 
employs primary staff deputies.  The TAC 2 CP is designed for a 2-man SSE slice that is 
not capable of supporting 24-hour operations.102  Figures 26 and 27 show the TAC 1 and  
                                                 
101 Operational and Organizational Concept Paper for the Space Support Element (SSE) in the 
Unit of Employment x (UEx), 10. 
102 Ibid., 6-8. 
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TAC 2 CP SSE support design.  Note that the “Force Application / Tac 1” title does not 
indicate that these elements are performing actions in the Force Application mission area.  
They are specifically designed to perform Force Enhancement functions. 
 
Figure 26. SSE Support to TAC 1 CP103 
                                                 
103 Operational and Organizational Concept Paper for the Space Support Element (SSE) in the 
Unit of Employment x (UEx), 11. 
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Figure 27. SSE Support to TAC 2 CP104 
 In September 2004, the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) disapproved the FDU that 
would have established the 6-man SSE.  The disapproval directed the UEx SSE be 
reduced from six personnel, the objective SSE design in the FDU, to two personnel.  This 
decision eliminated the two SATCOM NCO’s and two Space Operations Officers in 
TAC1 and TAC2 and left a force structure in the Main CP consisting of two FA40s, a 
Lieutenant Colonel and a Major.  This SSE design is shown in Figure 28.  The CSA 
disapproval was driven by the recommendation of the Combined Arms Doctrine 
Directorate (CADD) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This decision effectively eliminated 
24/7 capability for space operations in the three UEx CPs as designed by the original 
FDU and consolidated all of the remaining space operations personnel at the Main CP.105   
The rationale for the CADD disapproval recommendation and ensuing UEx SSE 
force reduction is a change to the UEx operational concept.  The original SSE FDU was 
                                                 
104 Operational and Organizational Concept Paper for the Space Support Element (SSE) in the 
Unit of Employment x (UEx), 11. 
105 Operational and Organizational Concept Paper for the Space Support Element (SSE) in the 
Unit of Employment x (UEx), 2. 
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designed to support sustained JTF operational capability as directed.  The UEx 
operational concept was subsequently changed from a “sustained” JTF operational 
capability to an “initiated” JTF operational capability.  CADD’s position is that all 
remaining space operations capability can be consolidated at the Main CP and the TAC 1 
and TAC 2 CPs can be supported via networked systems.106   
    
 
Figure 28. Modified SSE Design107 
The SMDC DCD is coordinating with CADD to resolve the differences in regard 
to designed and operationally required SSE force structure.  Any FDU update that does 
not have the concurrence of the CADD will most likely be disapproved by the CSA.  
SMDC initiated a change to the SSE Force Design Update in February 2005 to regain 
some of the space support operations capability and force structure in the UEx.  The 
CADD supports the addition of the two Signal NCOs from the original FDU to the FDU  
                                                 
106 Operational and Organizational Concept Paper for the Space Support Element (SSE) in the 
Unit of Employment x (UEx), 2. 
107 Ibid., 5. 
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change documentation.  “CADD recognized the requirement for two NCOs and changed 
their position; however, we were unable to resolve the issues relating to the number and 
duty location of the FA40 Space Operations Officers (SOO).”108  
SMDC agrees that the space operations personnel in the SSE can be consolidated 
at the Main CP, but maintains that at least three FA40s must be in the SSE.  The SMDC 
submitted this FDU update and is awaiting approval or disapproval of this amended UEx 
SSE design.  It is likely that the CSA will approve a 4-man SSE structure for the UEx as 
recommended by the CADD.  SMDC will continue to man the UEx SSEs to the objective 
strength of six until the final decision on this issue has been made. The manning of the 
SSEs is a critical aspect for the entire Army space community.  The FA40 manpower 
pool is very small, approximately 150 officers.  A force structure change from a 2-man 
SSE to a 4 or 6-man SSE has huge impacts on the ability of FA40 personnel to support 
both the tactical and operational warfighters and the strategic-level space billets the Army 
fills.  The FA40 manpower issues and conflicting requirements will be specifically 
addressed in Chapter V.  
C. MISSIONS FOR THE OPERATIONAL SPACE SUPPORT ELEMENTS 
The 1st Space Brigade codified a list of capabilities that the Army has requested 
from space assets.  This list of capabilities is traced from Army Transformational 
documents and from the Brigade’s space assets participation in Joint and Army exercises 
and experimentation, SSE and ARSST operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 
development of Army Space doctrine; concepts; plans; and tactics, techniques and 
procedures (TTP).  The Space Brigade also used over ten years of experience in 
deploying ARSSTs in support of various levels of command.  
The Space Brigade broke the Army’s Space needs down into three groupings;   
Battle Command, ISR, and Situational Awareness.  The Army Space capabilities are 
shown in Table 4 with respect to these three enabled mission areas: 
                                                 
108 United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command. Memorandum for Record: 
Rebuttal of CADD Non-concurrence to USASMDC Force Design Update UEx Space Support Element. 




Army Mission Area Supporting Space Capability 
Battle Command Battle command on the move 
Modularity 
Distributed mission planning/rehearsal/trng 
Continuous C2 
Global secure communications 
Precision navigation and timing 
Reachback  
ISR Real-time ISR 
Precision navigation and timing 
Global WTEM 
Situational Awareness Early warning 
Joint Blue Force Tracking 
Dynamic retasking 
Precision navigation and timing 
Detection and avoidance of Obstacles 
In-transit total asset visibility 
Table 4. Space Capabilities Supporting Army Needs109 
From the Transformation framework and the work done by the 1st Space Brigade, 
the Future Warfare Center’s Training Division within SMDC developed an initial 
mission statement for the SSEs in support of their UEx.  The mission of the SSE is 
“ensure the planning, integration and coordination of the space mission areas into UEx 
plans, orders and operations.”110  The Training Division then developed a list of critical 
tasks that the SSE must be able to perform to execute this mission statement. 
                                                 
109 Story, Kurt, Army Theater Space Support in Joint Operations Brief, (Colorado Springs, 
CO.:2005), 2.  
110 Dow, Richard, Space Support Element (SSE) Overview to the FA40 Conference, (Colorado 
Springs, CO.: 2005), 3.  
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Figure 29. UEx SSE Critical Tasks111 
Based upon the 3rd ID’s experiences in Iraq, the critical tasks identified by the 
Training Division were arranged into two categories.  Those categories were SSE Unique 
Tasks and SSE Enhancing Tasks.  The distinction arises from the numerous mission areas 
that overlap between the Army Signal, Intelligence, Space communities and others.  The 
issue revolves around whether the organic SSE is providing a unique space capability or 
simply helping to enhance a capability being provided by other staff sections.  The ability 
to provide a unique capability to a supported UEx is essential to validating the SSE and 
overall space support concepts and force structure.  The Unique and Enhancing tasks are 
shown in Table 5: 
                                                 
111 Brozek, Dennis, UEx Space Support Element (SSE) Support to the Warfighter Brief, (Fort 
Drum, NY: 2005), 8. 
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SSE Unique Tasks SSE Enhancing Tasks 
Space Intelligence Preparation of the 
            Battlefield (IPB) 
Support to Space Weather Analysis 
Theater and Global Reach to Space Forces Support to GPS Analysis 
Development of Space-Related Targets Support to Battlefield Characterization 
 Support to Blue Force Tracking 
 Support to Imagery and Topography 
Table 5. SSE Unique and Enhancing Tasks112 
All of these tasks fall under the mission area of Space Force Enhancement.  It is 
important to note there is a significant difference between the Space Essential Tasks and 
METL tasks identified earlier.  The Space Essential Tasks initially identified in TP 525-
3-14 and in the Space Brigade/Battalion METL tasks specifically mention the Space 
Control mission area.  The SSE tasks are Force Enhancement centric.  
It is also important to note the unique tasks, Space IPB and Space Targeting are 
space-centric subsets of established Army targeting and IPB doctrine and processes.  It is 
arguable that Theater and Global reach to Space Forces is a function of communications 
reachback not a stand alone, unique space capability. 
The previous paragraph is possibly the most damaging argument against 
dedicating force structure and resources down to Brigade/UA and UEx level; SSEs are in 
fact very useful, but they are doing tasks that augment another staff element’s function.  
The mission area where that is not the case is Space Control.  The force structure has 
been established for a Space Control Company in the 1st Space Battalion.  A fielded, 
tactical Space Control system that could quickly deploy and support any level of 
command in any Service or Joint headquarters is an undeniable, space-unique task.  The 
issue of fielding such a capability and equipping the Space Control Company will be 
addressed in Chapter VI. 
                                                 
112 Dow, Richard, Space Support Element (SSE) Overview to the FA40 Conference Brief, 
(Colorado Springs, CO.: 2005), 6. 
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V. MANNING THE SPACE FORCE 
A. OVERVIEW 
The Army’s space mission area is the responsibility of the Space Operations 
Career Field, FA40.  The FA40 Career Field is a relatively new development, beginning 
in the mid ‘90’s.  The ability to pursue a career path solely in the space mission area 
enables space operations officers to gain and utilize space expertise while remaining 
competitive for promotion. 
The 2001 Space Commission, chaired by the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, 
directed that all Services establish a Space Cadre.  The FA40 Space Operations Officers 
are the core of the Army’s Space Cadre.  A Space Force Management Analysis is 
underway in the Army to identify what officers, enlisted personnel and civilians will be 
part of the Space Cadre. 
There are three levels of manning requirements to which FA40s are assigned.  
This chapter identifies those levels and discusses the tradeoffs and personnel shortfalls 
that occur in order to embed organic Space Support Elements at the UEx, UA, or UEy 
levels while still maintaining the 1st Space Brigade units.  Determining the proper 
allocation of the small number of FA40s in the Army is an ongoing effort and debate 
within the Army Space community.   
B.  EMERGENCE OF THE FA40 SPACE OPERATIONS OFFICER 
The Army Functional Area 40 (FA40) is also called the Space Operations 
functional area.  It is part of the Information Operations (IO) Career Field within the 
Army.  There are four Career Fields within the Army; Information Operation, Operations, 
Operations Support, and Institutional Support.  The Career Field (CF) designation began 
in 1998 and enabled officers to continue their careers in career fields other than their 
basic branch and still progress through the ranks.  Officers electing to leave their basic 
branches become part of the Information Operations, Operations Support or Institutional 
Support Career Fields depending on their selected Functional Area.  FA40s enter the IO 
Career Field.  Those officers choosing to remain within their respective basic branches 
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Table 6. Career Fields with Corresponding Functional Areas113 
The population size of the Information Operations Career Field is the smallest of 
the four categories.  The distribution within the Army is 69% in the Operations CF, 14% 
in the Operations Support CF, 10% in the Institutional Support CF, and 7% in the 
Information Operations CF.114  The FA40 officer pool is a very small group within the 
Army and numbers roughly 150 officers. 
Officers select their desired CF at the ten-year mark in their careers.  Once 
approved to enter the FA40 CF, officers do not return to their basic branches for 
assignment.  They will be assigned in FA40 positions for the rest of their career.  This is 
important because most FA40s will not develop Space Operations experience until they  
                                                 
113 Driscoll, Jerome, FA40 Conference Update Brief, (Alexandria, VA: 2005), 8. 
114 Ibid., 4.  
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are Majors with 10 or more years of service.  The CF will be inexperienced compared 
with the rank structure of the Operations CF, and even more so when compared with the 
Air Force’s Space community. 
The FA40 CF has two separate tracks, which are called areas of concentration 
(AOC).  The AOCs for FA40 are the Space Operations Officer (AOC 40A) and 
Astronaut (AOC 40C).  The Army currently has seven 40Cs assigned to the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 
The Army FA40s are specifically identified as members of the DoD Space Cadre 
in Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-3, Commissioned Officer 
Development and Career Management.  “The Army requires officers that are technically 
trained and tactically experienced in the integration of all space capabilities to support 
Joint land component operations.”115  This unique role is the responsibility of the FA40A.  
The Army has tasked the FA40As to provide the ground commanders with integrated 
space capabilities to enhance military operations across the full spectrum of conflict.  DA 
Pam 600-3 specifies that the FA40s provide expertise and advice in the following areas: 
(a) Basic orbital mechanics, space operations, and space effects. 
(b) Space analysis and planning to support Army, Combined Arms, Joint,  
 Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM)   
 operations. 
(c) Utilization and integration of space capabilities with terrestrial, air, and 
 near-space based systems owned by the DoD, Intelligence   
 Community, Civil Agencies and commercial partners to provide  
 integrated and timely support to the warfighter. 
(d) Integrating and coordinating information operations which include  
 computer network attack and defense, electronic warfare,   
 operational security, military psychological operations, and  
 military deception.  
(e) Space support procedures and infrastructure for tasking, posting,  
 processing, and utilization (TPPU) of space products and  
 telemetry, tracking, and command of space systems.       
(f) Limitations and vulnerabilities of space systems to weather,   
 interference, infrastructure failures, and attack. 
(g) International law and treaties and U.S. policy. 
                                                 
115 Department of the Army, Department of the Army, Pamphlet 600-3: Commissioned Officer 
Development and Career Management, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 42-1. 
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(h) Familiarity with United States civil and military space programs as  
 well as those of other nations. 
(i) Commercial space operations, activities and capabilities. 
(j) Procedures for development and integration of policy, concepts,  
 requirements, and acquisition for space capabilities. 
(k) Use of modeling, simulation, analysis, and other tools to support  
 development and use of space capabilities.116 
The principal educational tool for equipping the FA40 officers with expertise in 
these areas is the Space Operations Officer Qualification Course (SOOQC).  SMDC 
began conducting the SOOQC in 2001 and it was initially an eight week course.  SOOQC 
is conducted an average of twice a year in Colorado Springs.  The SOOQC increased in 
duration and is now an eleven week course.  The SOOQC classes have included officers 
from every Service branch and have also included Space officers from the National 
Guard and Reserve.  The Army has sent officers of every rank from Captain to Brigadier 
General as well as non-commissioned officers working in space positions.  
With the establishment of the FA40 career path, the Army made a commitment to 
man the current and Objective Force with space-knowledgeable officers and to ensure 
that these officers have a career path that keeps them competitive for promotion.  The 
ongoing challenge with respect to personnel issues is placing the low-density FA40 
officer pool in positions benefiting not only the warfighter, but enabling the increased 
capability and performance of the Army space community.  Increasing billet 
requirements for FA40s in the emerging Objective Force structure requires an increased 
number of FA40s in the Army.  This will be a very difficult task to accomplish as one of 
the primary tenets of the Objective Force is for smaller-sized forces, not increased 
personnel strength of headquarters staff elements.        
C. THE ARMY SPACE CADRE 
In January 2001, the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space 
Management and Organization released their final report.  The Honorable Donald 
Rumsfeld chaired the commission.  Commission members were appointed by the 
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Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services (CAS) of the United States House of 
Representatives, the Chairman of the CAS of the United States Senate, the ranking 
minority members of the CAS of the House and Senate, and the Secretary of Defense.  
Members of the Commission included retired general officers from the Army, Navy and 
Air Force with space expertise, retired Congressmen, and leading figures in the 
government and private sector that possess in-depth and unique expertise in space 
operations.  The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 authorized the 
Commission’s activities and mandated their final report. 
The Commission’s charter was to assess the organization and management of 
space activities that support U.S. national security interests.”117  The 1996 National Space 
Policy was the document that identified space functions and missions that were assessed 
by the Commission.  The Commission focused on DoD and Intelligence Community 
space actions, but also looked at commercial and civil space activities as well.118 
The Commission report identified the United States interests in space.  Those 
interests are: 
Promote the peaceful use of space. 
Use the nation’s potential in space to support U.S. domestic, economic,  
 diplomatic and national security objectives. 
Develop and deploy the means to deter and defend against hostile acts  
 directed at U.S. space assets and against the uses of space   
 hostile to U.S. interests.119 
 From the reports established interests in space, the Commission identified five 
tasks the government must execute to advance those interests.  The tasks required to 
achieve the U.S. space interests are: 
Transform U.S. military capabilities. 
Strengthen U.S. intelligence capabilities. 
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Shape the international legal and regulatory environment that affects 
 activities in space 
Advance U.S. technological leadership related to space operations. 
Create and sustain a cadre of space professionals.120 
This section focuses on the fifth task identified above – creating and sustaining a 
Space Cadre.  The Army Space community believes that to create a highly skilled Space 
Cadre, the DoD and the Army have to increase investments in career development, 
education, and training of space professionals to achieve and maintain a necessary level 
of competent military and civilian space experts. 
Military space professionals will have to master highly complex 
technology; develop new doctrine and concepts of operation for space 
launch, offensive and defensive space operations, power projection in, 
from and through space and other military uses of space; and operate some 
of the most complex systems ever built and deployed.121 
The Space Commission identified three essential areas necessary for developing a 
highly competent military and civilian space cadre.  These three areas are development of 
a military space culture, a professional military space education, and a science and 
engineering workforce.  Key factors identified by the Space Commission developing a 
military space culture are senior leadership, enhanced space career paths, formal 
education processes, and longer duration space tours.122       
D.   SPACE FORCE MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS REVIEW (FORMAL)  
The fifth task, to create and sustain a cadre of space professionals, is the impetus 
for SMDC conducting a Force Management and Analysis Review (FORMAL) of Army 
space activities.  The Army Space FORMAL is directly linked to the findings and 
conclusions put forward in the Space Commission’s Final Report.  The Final Report  
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resulted in Congressional, DoD and Secretary of Defense directives that instructed all 
services to develop a Space Cadre Strategy.  SMDC is the lead for developing the Space 
Cadre Strategy and chose the FORMAL process in 2004 to assess the mission area. 
In order to comply with Department of Defense direction, the Army has 
decided to use the Force Management and Analysis Review (FORMAL) 
process to establish and maintain a professional space cadre.  The 
FORMAL process was selected for several reasons.  First, as the capstone 
force management tool, the FORMAL review provides intensive 
management forums to facilitate Army-wide integration of all activities 
required to produce and sustain mission capable units to perform Army 
missions.  Second, the FORMAL allows senior Army leaders to resolve 
issues affecting execution of programs and initiatives within the Space 
Cadre.  Finally, it provides a valuable forum for horizontal and vertical 
integration within the Army.123      
SMDC began the FORMAL process not solely to meet DoD and Congressional 
guidance.  The FORMAL also has potential benefits for the transforming Army.  The 
Army did not have a way to identify, track and develop the diverse capabilities of their 
military and civilian work force that can fill Joint, DoD and Service space billets.  The 
Space FORMAL provides an initial course of action to track and train this workforce. 
As the largest user of space products and services, the Army needs to maximize 
its use of their space experts to ensure maximum input into future space products and 
system development.  Shrewd placement of space cadre in requirements development at 
Joint and Service level are critical if Army interests are to be captured and embedded in 
space systems development.  The Space FORMAL provides an initial framework to 
manage placement of space cadre officers once they are identified and tracked.   
The Space FORMAL could potentially result in increased funding of Army space 
activities.  The Space FORMAL provides an overview of the Army’s Space Cadre as 
mandated by Congress and DoD.  Compliance in this area may result in additional 
resources to fund Service-specific space activities.124 
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The Space FORMAL process has four phases.  The phases are: 
Phase I will establish an Army-unique definition for the Army Space  
 Cadre for use in the remaining three phases.  
Phase II is a vertical analysis of all Army structure conducted by all  
 elements of the Army to identify roles, missions, organizations,  
 functions and personnel based on the approved Phase I Space  
 Cadre definition. 
Phase III is a functional review which reviews and develops,   
 comprehensive Department of the Army policies supporting the  
 Army Space cadre within the eight life cycle functions (structure,  
 acquisition, individual training and education, distribution,   
 deployment, sustainment, professional development, and   
 separation). 
Phase IV is a comprehensive analysis of the doctrine, organization,  
 training, materiel, leadership & education, personnel, and facilities  
 (DOTMLPF) domains to develop the final recommended Army  
 Space Cadre Strategy.125 
Initially the Army’s Space Cadre will consist entirely of its FA40 Space 
Operations Officers.  The FA40s are to be the Core Army Space Cadre or Space 
Professionals.  The Space Professional category could also contain military (non-FA40) 
and civilian career space personnel.  To comply with the DoD and Congressional 
mandates stemming from the Space Commission final report, Department of the Army 
Civilians (DACs) and other military personnel will be added to the Cadre.  The Space 
FORMAL recommendation is DACs, warrant officers and enlisted personnel not become 
part of the Space Professional category unless the Army establishes a similar space career 
field for them as exists for the FA40s.   
The FORMAL process also identified two additional personnel resource pools 
that could augment the Space Professionals as Space Cadre members.  Space Enabler and 
Space Support are two other resource pool categories along with Space Professionals that 
could constitute the Space Cadre.   
Space Enablers are military and civilian personnel who are not in the Space 
Career Field but who require space training to work in their duty position.  They enable 
space operations because of their job’s assigned duties; however, they are not FA40 
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Space Operation Officers.  They are currently not part of the Core Space Cadre.  An 
example of this category would be an Army Signal officer working in the 1st Satellite 
Control Battalion.  Their assignments are not tracked and managed by the FA40 Career 
Field. 
The Space Support category is comprised of all personnel assigned to space 
organizations and support day to day activities.  They would not require specific space 
training to perform their job but are organic assets to the space unit such as medical, 
logistic or finance personnel.  They are not part of the space career field nor are their 
career path tracked and managed by the FA40 assignment officer.     
Adding either the Space Enabler or Space Support personnel pool, or both, to the 
Space Cadre will meet the Commission’s guidance to include DACs and other military 
personnel.  The inherent problem with inclusion of DACs or non-FA40 officers in the 
Space Cadre is that there is no single control point within the Department of the Army to 
track and manage career progression.    
That is the purpose of Phase I and Phase II of the FORMAL process.  Define the 
criteria for being a member of the Space Cadre and then identify those personnel, 
organizations, skills and positions that meet the Phase I definition of a Space Cadre 
member.     
The Army embedded the guidance from the Space Commission in the latest 
revision of DA PAM 600-3, discussed in the first section of this chapter.  The FA40 
personnel pool is identified as the core of the Army’s Space Cadre in compliance with 
Commission and Congressional guidance. “FA40s are the core of the Army’s Space 
Cadre, a key element of DoD’s Space Cadre.  The Space Cadre was created per the 2001 
DoD Commission to Assess US National Security Space Management and 
Organization.”126 
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A critical aspect of Phase III of the FORMAL process is identifying the personnel 
issues and problems associated with training, tracking, assigning and educating a Space 
Cadre.  Currently, the FA Proponent Office and the FA40 Assignment Officer are the 
caretakers of the Space Cadre because the FA40s are the only resource pool from which 
the Cadre is drawn.  If DACs and other military officers, warrant officers and soldiers 
become part of the Space Cadre the complexity of tracking, training, assigning and 
educating this diverse, large number of personnel becomes very complex.  It is made 
even more problematic if these DACs and additional military members are not in a 
dedicated space career field.  Phase III of the Space FORMAL will develop DA policies 
that will support the Army’s Space Cadre across the eight life cycle functions.   
An example of this problem is a communications NCO assigned to an ARSST 
team or a Military Intelligence Officer assigned to a Commercial Exploitation Team.  If 
they are not in a space career field, their parent branch is responsible for training, 
tracking, assigning and educating them to ensure they remain competitive for promotion.  
Those responsibilities will at some point in time conflict with their space missions.  
Eventually, such personnel will have to return to parent branch assignments after 
developing valuable space expertise.  Such a situation does not serve the best interests of 
those individuals, the Space Cadre or the Army.  Having a very small number of FA40 
space experts does not necessarily serve the Army’s best interests either.  Expanding the 
FA40 ranks however will be very contentious.  The recommendation of the FORMAL is 
to include only those personnel who are in the space career field.  Optimizing space 
expertise and manpower cannot be adequately performed if Space Cadre members are 
continually rotating through the mission area. 
The final phase of the FORMAL process, Phase IV is to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Space DOTMLFP (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, 
Leadership and Education, Facilities, and Personnel) and develop the Army Space Cadre 
Strategy.  The Army Space Cadre Strategy will provide the road map for a space force  
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that optimizes its benefit to the Transformed Army.  The final product from Phase IV is 
the Army Space Cadre Strategy.  The Vice Chief of Staff, Army will decide what courses 
of action will be implemented to execute the Space Cadre Strategy. 127  
The FORMAL will benefit the Army Space community by providing resources in 
the 2008-2013 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and establishing priorities and 
necessary actions to achieve long-term goals through the Space Cadre Strategy.  The 
Army benefits from the Space FORMAL because a group of space experts is identified, 
managed, and tracked in order to leverage their capabilities for warfighter support.  The 
Army Space Cadre Strategy will be published in October 2005.   
E. MANNING REQUIREMENTS IN ARMY SPACE 
The Army’s FA40 proponent has separated the manning requirements into three 
categories.  The space personnel manning requirements categories are consistent with the 
Joint/Service levels of command.  The three categories are Strategic and Joint, 
Operational and Service, and Tactical.128  The examples of personnel assignment 
locations shown in Figure 30 are not all inclusive to their respective levels.  It is 
important to note that the Corps space support positions are shown in Figure 30 as 
“Tactical” billets.  Corps/UEy headquarters can execute tactical level combat operations 
but most likely will conduct operational-level missions.  UEy headquarters can execute 
across both levels.  This chapter’s material addressing Corps/UEy manning is consistent 
with Figure 30 and appears in the section on tactical-level manning.   
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Figure 30. FA40 Personnel Manning Levels129  
1. Tactical Manning 
At the tactical level of Division/UEx and below, FA40s will provide support with 
several elements.  The lowest echelon be supported by FA40s is the Brigade/UA.  FA40s 
may be assigned to the Fires and RSTA Brigades in each of the ten active Divisions/UEx.  
The highest tactical level supported is the UEx or possibly a Corps/UEy headquarters.   
The preponderance of tactical level space support comes from the UEx SSEs at 
two-star command or Division levels.  The UEx SSE as discussed in Chapter IV called 
for a six-man element in the original Force Design Update.  Table 7 shows the manning 
requirements for the SSE that was originally established in the Force Design Update and 
later reduced by the Chief of Staff, Army to one Lieutenant Colonel and one Major.  The 
final decision on the SSE force structure is still under review.   
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The FA40 manning requirement at Corps level, a three-star UEy headquarters, is 
currently one FA40 Major.  The three-star UEy command levels manned by FA40 Space 
Operations Officers are I, III, V, and XVIII Corps.130   
Army Space Support Team Space Support Element (UEx) 
ARSST Leader – Major (FA40) SSE Chief – Lieutenant Colonel (FA40) 
ARSST Officer - CPT (non-FA40) SSE Officer – Major (FA40) 
Intelligence NCO - Staff Sergeant (E6) SSE Officer – Major (FA40) 
SATCOM NCO - Sergeant (E-5) SSE Officer – Major (FA40) 
Topographical  NCO - Sergeant (E-5) SSE NCO – Staff Sergeant (E6) 
Info Systems Specialist - Specialist (E-4) SSE NCO – Staff Sergeant (E6) 
Table 7. ARSST and SSE Manning131 
2. Operational and Service Level   
Because the transformed UEy construct is still in the concept phase, the space 
support personnel plan to support the UEy is not finalized.  SMDC’s combat and force 
developers have considered an organic SSE at UEy level.  These UEy SSEs could be 
organic to Corps, Army, or Army Service Component Command-levels.  The number of 
proposed FA40s per space element at the Brigade/UA and UEy level is shown Table 8.  
If FA40s are emplaced at the UA level and at the various levels of UEy headquarters, 
there would be a strong argument to increase the number of available FA40s.   
Proposed Fires 
Brigade               
(10 Brigades) 
Proposed           
RSTA Brigade         
(10 Brigades) 
Proposed            
UEy SSE            
(Corps/ASCC/Army) 
Current           
Corps Support      
(4 Corps) 
FA40 Major FA40 Major FA40 Colonel FA40 Major 
 FA40 Major FA40 Lieutenant 
Colonel 
 
 Commo NCO FA40 Major  
Table 8. FA40 Manning at Brigade and UEy Levels132 
Operational level manning by FA40s is primarily at SMDC/ARSTRAT and 
Headquarters, Department of the Army.  There are currently no organic SSE-like  
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elements at this level.  If a Corps or EAC need space support to augment the FA40 Major 
who is on the Corps staff, an ARSST team would most likely be deployed to augment 
that headquarters.   
The ARSSTs generally support a Corps or an Echelon-above-Corps UEy when 
deployed.  The ARSST manning requirements are very similar to the originally proposed, 
objective UEx SSEs.  The ARSST is manned by a total of six soldiers under the 
leadership of an FA40 Major.  ARSST manning is the same as the UEx SSE except there 
are only two officers and the senior member of the ARSST is a Major compared to the 
rank heavier SSE which has a Lieutenant Colonel and two Majors. The SSE is officer 
heavy to facilitate manning three Command Posts. Table 7 shows the SSE in comparison 
with the 1st Space Battalion’s ARSSTs.      
3. Strategic and Joint Level 
Strategic and Joint level manning occurs at Combatant Commands and in such 
departments as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and DoD.  Each Combatant Command has an 
Army Service Component Command headquarters assigned to provide support.  The 
SSEs could also be organic to the Army Component supporting the warfighting 
Combatant Commands. They would be another level of the UEy SSE.  The UEy SSEs at 
the Army Component Command level could provide organic support to Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), Pacific Command 
(PACOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and European Command (EUCOM).  
The UEy SSE manning proposal consists of a Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel and a 
Major.133  In comparison with the UEx SSE, the UEy SSE will have fewer people, as they 
will support a single command post, but have a higher rank structure to interact with their 
Joint and Service staff counterparts.  
A robust Army space operations element is also located at STRATCOM.  
Determining the proper manning requirements for the Joint Space Operations Center at 
Vandenberg AFB will be a crucial task for SMDC.  Solidifying roles and responsibilities  
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of these space operations elements and support cells for other Combatant Commands is 
still ongoing and will have a significant impact on the ability to man the three personnel 
levels with FA40s.    
4. Balancing the Manning Requirements 
The challenge in distributing the FA40s throughout the three manning categories 
is a complicated issue made even more difficult by Army Transformation and the efforts 
to embed organic space forces in tactical units.  In February 2005, the distribution of the 
Army’s roughly 150 Space Operations Officers was 33% in Strategic and Joint positions, 
31% in Operational and Service positions, 18% in Tactical positions and 18% in schools 
and non-space positions.134 
It is fairly obvious that having the same percentage of FA40s in tactical 
assignments, as are in school and in non-space billets, is not an optimal distribution of 
personnel.  The Army’s shift in focus to recreating Legacy Divisions into Modular 
Divisions and Brigades resulted in significant changes in FA40 positions and manning.  
There is much uncertainty in the final SSE force structure that will be organic to the UEx.  
Final approvals by the CSA on the UEx SSE as well as FA40s at UEy, Corps and Brigade 
levels are pending.  These decisions will take several years to resolve.  SMDC has made 
manning the ten UEx/Division SSEs the top priority.  Filling the Brigade, Corps and UEy 
SSE positions with FA40s will follow the UEx SSE priority. 
The greatest challenge in the personnel arena is creating more than current 150 
FA40 positions in the Army.  With the rapidly expanding demand for space operations 
officers in the UEx SSE, UEy and Fires/RSTA Brigades, the distribution of FA40s in the 
Tactical category could reach as high as 65% of the personnel pool.  Such an imbalance 
would not serve the Army’s best interests in the Strategic/Joint and Operational/Service 
categories.  If Joint and Service space billets are not manned, eventually a lack of Army 
representation in these forums will result in an absence of Army-centric requirements, 
concerns and issues.  Eventually, weak or no representation at the Joint and Service level 
will adversely impact the performance of FA40s to provide support in the tactical billets.   
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The best solution from a space perspective is to “grow the career field” and add 
FA40 billets to the current strength of approximately 150.  Doubling the number of 
FA40s is not inappropriate if tactical level manning continues to expand.  As touched on 
in an earlier chapter, such growth in personnel at headquarter staffs is completely 
opposite to Army Transformation principles.  Equally problematic is that any increase in 
FA40 strength will almost assuredly result in equal decreases to the Army’s signal and 
military intelligence billets.  This zero-sum situation will draw strong opposition from 
those communities, both of whom hold principal staff directorates on the Department of 
Army (DA) Staff.  The space community does not have an equal directorate position on 
the DA Staff.   
It is highly unlikely that the FA40 community will grow significantly in strength 
over the remainder of this decade.  The critical personnel decisions will ultimately be 
made by SMDC/ARSTRAT concerning suitable distribution of the limited number of 
FA40s across the three manning categories.  The Space Cadre Strategy will incorporate 
suitable analysis of the manning level tradeoffs and provide a roadmap for the FA40 
career field.  However, the ultimate long-term success of the FA40s rests with the Army 
Space community’s ability to increase their authorized personnel strength.   
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VI. EQUIPPING THE SPACE FORCE 
A. OVERVIEW 
The equipment used by the SSE and the ARSST are very similar and provides 
global communications reachback, increased bandwidth, and space products and services 
to their supported units.  Chapter VI provides a brief description of the equipment sets for 
the ARSST and SSE. 
The 1st Space Battalion has several one-of-a-kind, DoD-unique equipment 
packages within their assigned companies.  A brief outline is given of the equipment used 
by 1st Battalion subordinate units to perform their mission statements presented in 
Chapter II.  What do they use to execute their missions?  This chapter will not provide in-
depth analysis of the equipment performance and specifications.  It is intended to provide 
an overview of what Army space elements are using to complete their tasks. 
The foundation of any Army piece of equipment is a Service or Joint 
requirements document. The Army space requirements documentation have not been 
written and approved to equip existing space force structure to perform their mission.  
Without valid requirements documents, there is no vehicle to equip Army space forces 
within the DoD materiel acquisition framework.  The absence of necessary requirements 
documents will be highlighted.   
B. ARMY SPACE REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT 
The responsibility for requirements development for Army space belongs to the 
Director of Combat Developments in SMDC.  The Combat Developments Directorate is 
part of the Future Warfare Center in Colorado Springs.  The requirements development 
process has experienced significant changes the last several years as part of a massive 
effort across DoD to streamline the acquisition process.  All of the Army and Joint 
requirements guidelines and processes were updated in 2003 and 2004. 
The biggest changes were the emergence of the Initial Capabilities Document 
(ICD), Capabilities Development Document (CDD) and the Capabilities Production  
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Document (CPD).  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3170.01A, 
Operation of the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System (JCIDS), defines 
the requirements development process for DoD. 
In earlier versions of CJCSM 3170.01A different documents were used in the 
requirements development process.  The new ICD replaces the previously used Mission 
Need Statement (MNS).  Both documents addressed the same requirements topic.  “The 
ICD documents the JCIDS analyses that describe a capability gap and explains why a 
recommended materiel approach is most appropriate.”135  Both the MNS and the ICD 
identify a warfighting capability that is needed and explains why the materiel solution is 
required.  The ICD defines the concept and sets the foundation for technology 
development.  The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) must approve an ICD 
before it can proceed to a Milestone A (MS A) decision.   
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) is held by the Air Force for Joint space 
systems.  The Army’s Program Executive Office – Space (PEO-Space) has MDA for 
Army-centric space systems.  A large amount of analyses, concept and architecture 
development, and functional area analysis must be done to support the ICD in order to 
reach a Milestone A decision. Milestone A signals the start of a Technology 
Development Strategy to support the warfighting concept. 136    
The MS A decision is the validation of the Concept Refinement phase and the 
gateway for initiating the Technology Development phase.  At the end of the Concept 
Refinement and Technology Development phases a materiel solution should be the 
evident solution to satisfy an approved warfighting requirement.  However, a materiel 
solution for a mission need is not always the outcome.  There is considerable analysis 
conducted that will determine if a materiel solution is in fact needed.  An Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA) may find a materiel solution is not necessary and the identified 
mission need can be satisfied through other measures, such as changes in training or 
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doctrine.  The requirement and initial concept of the materiel solution should be framed 
in an existing or emerging architecture.  The ICD is the vehicle that establishes the 
warfighting requirement and replaces the Mission Need Statement.      
With an approved ICD, a draft Capabilities Development Document (CDD), and a 
Technology Development Strategy, a Milestone B decision is made by the MDA.  An MS 
B is the official start of a DoD acquisition program.  The System Development and 
Demonstration (SDD) acquisition phase can begin after an MS B decision. In the SDD 
phase, the requirements developers draft a Capabilities Production Document (CPD).  
The technology developers and acquisition personnel demonstrate the needed technology 
for the system.  A prototype is built showing that the needed technology can be 
incorporated into a suitable system that meets the warfighting requirements established 
by the ICD and CDD.   
After the SDD phase, a system CPD is approved by the JROC and a Milestone C 
decision is made by the MDA.  The MS C begins the Production and Deployment phase 
during which initial production and operational testing occur.  After operational testing a 
Final Design Review is conducted prior to Full Rate Production. The requirements 
developers are continually involved in demonstration and testing to ensure the system 
delivers the needed warfighting capability.137 
The requirements developers in the SMDC Future Warfare Center are the key 
personnel in establishing the ICD, CDD and CPD for Army space systems.  The CDD 
and CPD replace the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) in the updated 
requirements process.  Until MS B and establishing of a Program Office, the 
requirements developers are the driving force behind the early stages of the acquisition 
process.  After the program office is established, the requirements developers are the 
direct link from the technology development, prototype demonstration, system 
operational testing and the warfighter requirements and capability gaps.  A robust space  
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requirements development section is critical to the acquisition process for any Army 
space system, and equally important if Army requirements are needed in Joint space 
systems. 
The Army Space Policy clearly states the Army will pursue space capabilities and 
systems.  Space has evolved into a Joint mission area and this Joint nature is accepted by 
all of the Services.  The Army understands the Air Force will be the lead Service on 
almost all new satellite systems.  The key for the Army as the largest user of space is to 
have space expertise in the form of FA40s in the requirements development offices at 
Joint and Air Force levels.  The only chance the Army has of optimizing the use of new 
satellite systems is to embed Army-specific needs in the Joint and Air Force space 
requirements process.   
The Joint nature and extremely high cost of new space-based systems, as well as a 
ground-based space control capability, make it very unlikely the Army will ever acquire a 
Service-specific system.  Until 2004, the only approved Army space systems 
requirements document was for a Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite (KE ASAT) system. This 
requirements document is almost 20 years old and the KE ASAT project was abandoned 
and mothballed in the ‘90’s.   
There have been recent Army ICDs developed for a tactical, ground-based 
capability to counter threat imagery and communications satellites. An Army ICD has 
also been developed by SMDC to establish a warfighting requirement to conduct 
surveillance of satellites with a ground-based system.  The concept is to have in-theater, 
tactical, ground-based targeting and engagement capabilities to counter threat satellites.  
This sensor-to-shooter pairing would provide a counter-satellite communications and 
counter-satellite imagery capability.  The Army intent to acquire such a Space Control 
System capability is openly stated in the Army Space Policy.  The Army has one 
validated ICD for a counter-satellite communications capability and has a counter-
satellite imagery ICD that will soon be reviewed by the Department of the Army for 
approval.  These requirements documents have not been approved by the JROC.  They 
have only received Army Requirements Oversight Council review.  A satellite 
surveillance ICD is currently being staffed for Army review and approval. 
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Discussion of the actual technology means to enable such capabilities and the 
specific target set quickly enters the Secret and Top Secret security classifications.  For 
this reason, in depth assessment of these ICD enabling technologies and the target sets is 
beyond the scope of this paper.   
The problem for the Army is taking a Service-centric approach to developing 
requirements documents for a Space Control and Space Surveillance capability.  Space 
Control and Space Surveillance are Joint mission areas.  Development of requirements 
documents in a Service, not Joint, manner is not likely to succeed.  The Air Force is the 
Executive Agent for space within DoD and is also the MDA for DoD space systems.  It is 
highly unlikely that such a capability will ever be acquired without the Air Force as the 
lead Service.  Ground-based, tactical systems with such a capability may arguably be the 
sole domain of the Army, but developing and acquiring such sensors and engagement 
capabilities is a Joint domain.  The Air Force is unquestionably the DoD lead for this 
domain. 
The Army does not have sufficient funding or manpower to pursue development 
of Army-centric space requirements and capabilities; it must be done in a Joint 
environment.  Because space control missions have approval authority at the President 
and Secretary of Defense levels - Battle Management, Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers and Intelligence (BMC4I) systems are also Joint in nature.  
Developing a Space Control and Surveillance requirements document must be Joint 
solely from a communications architecture perspective. Future development of Army 
space requirements are important, but almost as important is accepting the reality that 
such development must be done through a Joint Program Office, and most likely with the 
Air Force as the lead agency. 
C. CURRENT EQUIPMENT FOR ARMY SPACE FORCES 
The primary piece of equipment for the SSEs and the ARSSTs is the Space 
Support Element Toolset version 2 (SSETv2).  SSETv2 is mounted on a Highly Mobile 
Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) with a rigid wall shelter.  The SSET is 
composed of a Space Applications Technology Utility Reachback Node (SATURN) 
communications suite and four Space Operations Systems (SOS). 
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The SATURN communications suite is a Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) 
system.  The SATURN suite has Internet Protocol Satellite (IPSAT), International 
Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) and Iridium cell phone capability.  The 
communications capability and additional bandwidth that comes with a SATURN suite is 
highly valued by the elements supported by the SSE or ARSST. 
The Space Operating system (SOS) is a computer workstation that enables space 
analysis, imagery manipulation such as 3D fly throughs, common operational picture 
(COP) and situational awareness (SA) in support of tactical operations.  Space analysis is 
done through the use of Space and Missile Analysis Tool (SMAT), Space Battle 
Management Core System (SBMCS), and Satellite Tool Kit (STK) software on the SOS.  
COP and SA are enabled by use of Advanced Warfighting Environment (AwarE), 
Intelligence Situational Awareness Tool (ISAT), Command and Control Personal 
Computer (C2PC) software.  Imagery manipulation is enabled by the use of PC 
Datamaster, Falcon View, Sky View, Bird Dog, ERDAS Imagine and Electronic Light 
Table (ELT) 3500 software.   
There are two complete SSETv2 sets planned for each SSE.  The SSETv2 sets are 
mounted on the rigid wall shelter HMMWVs.  The SSETs will operate in the UEx TAC 
CP1 and TAC CP2.  One of the SSETv2 SOS workstations is a mobile system that will 
be dismounted and used in the Main CP.  An SSE will have two SATURN 
communications suites and eight total SOS workstations.  The SSE’s toolset is 
transported on two HMMWVs.  The ARSST is only equipped with one of the SSETv2 
HMMWV systems.   
The only major difference in the ARSST and the SSE in equipment is that the 
ARSTT has one vice two HMMWV mounted SSETs and the ARSSTs do not have an 
additional COTS upgrade.  The COTS upgrade includes a tactical server, a multifunction 
printer, an improved encryption device, a 1-terabyte NAS drive, dual monitors, and a 36-
inch plotter.  Both the ARSST and SSE toolsets enable critical reachback capability to the 
SMDC Operations Center in Colorado Springs.138 
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The Commercial Exploitation Team (CET) in the 1st Space Brigade is equipped 
with the Eagle Vision II mobile suite.  The Eagle Vision II van enables the CET to 
receive direct downlink from the SPOT 2, SPOT 4, Radarsat, Quickbird and IKONOS 
commercial imagery satellites.  Specific satellites are dependent upon direct contracting 
with individual companies.  The CET can receive and disseminate imagery of less than 
one-meter resolution within hours.  There are only two Eagle Vision suites in the Army 
and both belong to the 1st Space Battalion’s CET Company.   
The JTAGS Company is equipped with six of the Joint Tactical Ground Stations.  
A JTAGS section’s equipment consists of a JTAGS Shelter with M1022A1 Mobilizer, 
three satellite dish antennas, two 5-ton trucks, a 60kw generator and a HMMWV with 
trailer.  The JTAGS system is the key part of the Theater Event System (TES).  JTAGS 
receives direct downlink data from up to three Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites.  
The DSP data are then disseminated in theater to provide missile warning of incoming 
tactical ballistic missiles.  The JTAGS missile warning data is transmitted on existing 
TRAP Data Dissemination System (TDDS), Tactical Information Broadcast Service 
(TIBS), and the Joint Tactical Distribution System (JTIDS) communications networks.  
Future upgrades will enable JTAGS to receive sensor data from the Spaced-Based 
Infrared System (SBIRS) that will replace the DSP constellation.139  The JTAGS 
detachment deploys with two sections of equipment. 
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Figure 31. JTAGS Detachment Equipment140 
The Space Control Company is currently equipped with one Space Control 
Electronic Warfare Detachment (SEWD).  The SEWD is made up of “three expandable 
tactical vans (one for mission planning, one for command and control and one for the 
electronic warfare suite), generators, and the requisite antennas for the mission.  The 
ground suite is deployable by C-17 or C-5.”141  The current SEWD is composed of test 
and evaluation (T&E) equipment.  This equipment is not supported by a Force Design 
Update or an approved requirements document. 
The Space Control Company in 1st Space Battalion is the most glaring 
shortcoming with respect to equipping Army Space Forces.  The equipment consists 
entirely of T&E materiel and requires heavy contractor support.  This is clearly an 
equipment issue that must be addressed in several areas.  There must be a Joint or Army 
requirements document that formalizes and approves the need for such an equipment set.  
As T&E equipment it does not receive operation and maintenance funding from the 
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Army.  Any funding shortfalls that are not covered by T&E dollars must be met by 
SMDC’s annual budget.  Security is another issue that challenges the manning and 
fielding of this equipment set because much of the offensive space control technology 
and the target set are in compartmentalized Top Secret security classifications.   
Space Control and Electronic Warfare are areas that quickly move into Secret and 
Top Secret classification realms when target sets and technologies are discussed.  It is 
almost impossible to normalize the use of this equipment set if its targets and its means of 
affecting that target remain classified.  It also complicates manning the equipment if all 
operators must have a Secret or Top Secret clearance.  Fielding of such equipment 
requiring special manning and limited access to an operational unit such as 1st Space 
Battalion is not feasible and should be avoided.   
D. FUTURE EQUIPMENT 
Planned improvements to the Army space forces’ equipment are limited outside 
of software and SATCOM receiver upgrades.  The JTAGS shelters are in the process of 
being upgraded with the Multi-Mission Mobile Processor (M3P) that receives direct 
downlink sensor data from the SBIRS satellites.                     
There will be upgrades to the capability of the CET shelters to receive data from 
additional commercial imagery satellites.  The SSE and ARSST space toolsets will also 
be improved with software upgrades and additional COTS requisitions enabling them to 
perform their mission sets more efficiently.  New equipment that enables the ARSSTs, 
SSEs or other Space Battalion assets to do additional Space mission area tasks is not 
forthcoming.  The absence of valid requirements documents is one of the major reasons.   
The area of most concern will be equipping the Space Control Company.  Joint 
and Service doctrine and policy identify Space Control as a function the Army will 
pursue.  Establishing a Joint or Army-centric requirements document for tactical, ground-
based surveillance and negation platforms will be the focus of materiel solution efforts in 
the area of Space Control.  The Space Control Company has the mission, but not the 
equipment.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, it is not likely such a requirement will be 
approved by a JROC if it is not a Joint requirement. 
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Another option is for the SEWD T&E equipment to be proven as an effective 
mobile, Information Operations (IO) platform by the Space Control Company.  
SMDC/ARSTRAT has the mission from STRATCOM to be the Service lead for 
Information Operations.  SMDC could establish an operational requirement for an IO 
equipment suite to meet its mission responsibilities to STRATCOM.  Jamming of 
communications satellites is a subset of the Space Control mission but a requirements 
document could also be developed under the umbrella of IO.  This is an important 
distinction as the IO area is not the clear domain of the Air Force as is Space Control.  
The largest hurdle in equipping the Army Space forces is establishing valid operational 
requirements for a Space Control or IO system.    
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VII. SERVICE SPACE ORGANIZATIONS AND STRUCTURE 
A. OVERVIEW 
The Army’s sister Services have unique approaches to organizing their space 
forces, unique space career paths and personnel management, and unique mission area 
focus.  Chapter VII will look at the other Services and how they approach the space 
mission area. 
The Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force space organizations and manpower are 
widely varied across the Services.  The main factors driving the different approaches to 
organizing and manning the space forces are funding and available personnel.  The Air 
Force commits more people and dollars to the space mission than the other Services 
combined, roughly 86% of the annual DoD budget for space. 
Understanding the Services’ and the Joint perspective on space is important 
because the space mission area is undeniably Joint in nature, but dominated by the Air 
Force.  Awareness of the other Services’ mission area focus and organizational construct 
are important to understanding the Joint Space mission area.   
B. THE NAVY  
The Navy approaches space operations in terms of how the space mission enables 
network operations.  Navy space operations are the responsibility of the Naval Network 
Warfare Command (NETWARCOM).  The mission statement of the NETWARCOM is: 
To act as the Navy’s central operational authority for space, information 
technology requirement, network and information operations in support of 
naval forces afloat and ashore; to operate a secure and interoperable naval 
network that will enable effects-based operations and innovation; to 
coordinate and assess the Navy operational requirements for and use of 
network/command and control/information/technology/information 
operations and space; to serve as the operational forces’ advocate in the 
development and fielding of information technology, information 
operations and space and to perform such other functions and tasks as may 
be directed by higher authority.142 
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NETWARCOM headquarters is in Norfolk, Virginia.  The NETWARCOM 
commander was also the Commander of Naval Space Command and the Naval 
Component Commander to SPACECOM prior to its merger with STRATCOM.  The 
NETWARCOM commander is a 3-star Admiral who has the Naval Network and Space 
Operations Command (NNSOC) at Dahlgren, Virginia as a subordinate unit.  The merger 
of Naval Space Command and the Naval Network Operations Command formed 
NNSOC.  NNSOC provides focus for the Navy’s space requirements, operational 
management of space systems, operation of the Naval space surveillance network, 
tactical and operational space support, and backup capability to Cheyenne Mountain as 
the Alternate Space Control Center.  Within the NNSOC is the Naval Satellite Operations 
Center (NSOC) at Point Mugu, California.  NSOC conducts satellite telemetry, tracking 
and commanding and is “charged with maintaining the health and welfare of satellites 
that are critical to naval operations.”143 
The Navy completed a Space Cadre study as directed by the Space Commission 
Report of 2001.  This is the same type of effort the Army conducted with their Space 
FORMAL process.  The Navy’s Space Cadre Human Capital Strategy identifies multiple 
areas of space within the DoD that must be engaged to ensure the Navy has an integrated 
space capability.  “Space is an integral piece of the Naval Power 21 and FORCEnet that 
requires a highly integrated force capable of working in a joint and coalition 
environment, and going it alone when necessary.”144   
The Navy will distribute its Space Cadre across all sectors of DoD space so Naval 
requirements are reflected in future space system development and acquisition.  The 
Navy does not have anywhere near the necessary manpower and money to spend on the 
Space mission, but will leverage the work and resources of the other Services by placing 
space experts in five space sectors.  The Space Cadre Strategy defines these five 
functional areas of space as Assessment, Requirements, Science and 
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Technology/Research and Development, Acquisition, and Operations.  With a proper 
dispersion of space experts, the Space Cadre can “leverage their operational experience 
and formal education to ensure space systems are tactically relevant to maritime 
missions.”145  
The Army and the Navy have very similar goals for their Space Cadres but unlike 
the Army and Air Force, the Navy does not have a dedicated Space career path.  The 
Navy does not have an equivalent designator or career field like the Army’s FA40.  The 
Navy has 237 space billets as of October 2004, comparable to the Army’s FA40 
population of roughly 150 officers.146  The Navy’s Space Cadre move back and forth from 
assignments in the space mission area and their primary career paths.  This continual 
migration is necessary to maintain the officers’ promotion potential.  This is the major 
difference from the Army’s FA40s who will be promoted from the space operations 
career field.  
C. THE MARINE CORPS 
The Marines take a similar approach to the Navy in manning and organizing their 
space positions, but on a much smaller scale.  Like the Navy, the Marines do not have a 
dedicated space career path.  Marines work in space billets and then return to parent 
branches to remain competitive for promotion.  The Marine activities in space      are 
focused on reviewing requirements, policy, science and technology, operational plans, 
and doctrinal documents to ensure the Marine position and Service-unique requirements 
and concerns are reflected and integrated in these areas.   
The Marine organization in charge of performing space activities is the 
Information Operations and Space Integration Branch (PLI).  This organization is under 
the direction of a Marine Corps Colonel in Washington, D.C.  As well as being the 
Marine Corps lead for IO and space coordination, the PLI mission is also to: 
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Provide the Director, Strategy and Plans, with assistance to formulate, 
recommend, and coordinate staff actions on Marine Corps roles, plans, 
and direction in IO and space operations.147     
The Marine Corps requirement and concept for operational space support to 
warfighting is very similar to Army space operations.  The Marines desire a tactical space 
support element capable of moving with ground tactical forces.  The Navy abandoned 
their concept of tactical Naval Space Support Teams in the 90’s, but the Marine Corps 
still believes there is a role for tactical space support.  This similar support requirement is 
made evident by the space support provided to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) 
by an Army Space Support Team during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The Marine focus on 
the tactical support of the warfighter by space is evident in the distribution of their Space 
Cadre, of the Marines 111 space billets, 60 are at the tactical level.148        
D. THE AIR FORCE 
The Air Force manages all their space operations through the Air Force Space 
Command (AFSPC) at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado.  AFSPC is commanded by a 
4-star general and has the 14th Air Force, 20th Air Force, the Space and Missile Systems 
Center and the Space Warfare Center as subordinate units.  The 20th Air Force maintains 
and operates the Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and will not be addressed in 
depth.  The 14th Air Force is on Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), California and 
“manages the generation and employment of space forces to support STRATCOM and 
the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) operational plans and 
missions.”149  The Space and Missile Systems Center is responsible for developing, 
testing, acquiring and sustaining of space launch, command and control, missile and 
satellite systems.  The Space Warfare Center is responsible for integrating space systems 
and capabilities into Air Force operations. 
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Fourteenth Air Force will be the focus of this chapter’s Air Force space 
organizations.  The mission of the 14th AF is to control and exploit space for strategic, 
operational and tactical areas of operation.  The critical missions of the 14th AF are Space 
Superiority, Command and Control of Space Forces, Space Launch and Range, Satellite 
and Network Operations, and Surveillance, Warning and Battlefield Characterization. 
The 14th AF is made up of a Joint Space Operations Center and five wings.150   
The Joint Space Operations Center is a 24-hour command post at VAFB that is 
responsible for continuous command and control of space forces.  The Space Operations 
Center “conducts space combat planning and directs space combat operations across the 
spectrum of conflict by planning, tasking, synchronizing, integrating, and assessing 
execution of assigned and attached worldwide space forces.”151  
The five Wings in the 14th AF are the 21st Space Wing (SW) at Peterson AFB, 
Colorado, 30th SW at Vandenberg AFB, California, 45th SW at Patrick AFB, Florida, 50th 
SW at Schriever AFB, Colorado and 460th SW at Buckley AFB, Colorado.  The 30th SW 
and the 45th SW conduct and support preparation and launch operations from Vandenberg 
AFB and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida respectively.  The 30th and 45th SWs 
also support testing of submarine missiles and ICBMs.152  
The 50th SW operates satellite command and control and remote tracking stations.  
The 50th SW manages the eight tracking stations that make up the Air Force Satellite 
Control Network (AFSCN) and they support and operate the Fleet Satellite 
Communications System UHF Follow-on, the Milstar, NATO/Skynet, Defense Satellite  
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Communications System (DSCS), the Defense Meteorological Support Program 
(DMSP), the Defense Support Program (DSP), and the Global Positioning System 
satellite constellations.153  
The 21st SW provides global missile warning and space control to NORAD and 
STRATCOM.  “The wing provides early warning of strategic and theater ballistic missile 
attacks and foreign space launches.”  The wing also detects, tracks and catalogs more 
than 10,000 man-made space objects orbiting the Earth.  The global presence of the 21st 
SW is maintained via 26 squadrons located at more than 20 sites worldwide.154 
The 460th SW provides satellite communications support and signal testing and 
analysis for the DoD, academic communities and non-military government agencies.  The 
communications networks supported by the 460th SW are critical to the operational 
readiness of more than twenty five active, Reserve and National Guard units from every 
branch of service in the DoD.155 
The Air Force does not delineate between their Missile and Space career paths.  
Space and missile experts, or 13S personnel, rotate to assignments throughout the space 
and missile defense organizations.  The Air Force designates personnel in different 
functional areas within the space and missile community and the Air Force as a whole.  
The Air Force space professionals may also be personnel in the Science (61), Engineering 
(62) and Acquisition (63) functional areas.  The Air Force billets corresponding to these 
specialty areas are filled based upon personnel education, training and experience.  The 
science, engineering and acquisition personnel move to different assignments throughout 
the Air Force and might not perform 61, 62 or 63 code-related functions in the Space and 
Missile Operations community for the entirety of their career.156   
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In comparison with the Air Force, the Army Space career field has FA40A space 
operations officers and a handful of FA40C astronauts who will never work in FA40 
space operations organizations.  The Army, like the Air Force, does not have dedicated 
science, technology and acquisition personnel in the career field.  The Acquisition 
community is a separate career field across the entire Army.  Both Services would be 
well served to develop an acquisition and science personnel pool within their respective 
space communities that work solely in the space mission area.  
E. A FUTURE SPACE FORCE 
The underlying theme of the Joint and Service activities in the Space mission area 
has a long-term, future focus; this section will address the possibility of the establishment 
of a U.S. Space Force.  The Space Commission Report of 2001 specifically addressed the 
space organizations within the Services and how they could more effectively employ 
space systems “in independent operations or in support of air, land, and sea forces to 
deter and defend against hostile actions directed at the interests of the United States.”157  
The recommendations from the Space Commission Report for improved Services’ 
efficiency in space operations resulted in the Air Force being designated as the Executive 
Agent for Space in DoD.  The report’s recommendation also resulted in Air Force Space 
Command separating from the dual-hatted command structure it shared with the 
Commander, USSPACECOM.  These recommendations and subsequent changes were 
near term realignments. 
The Space Commission Report also presented midterm and long-term 
recommendations for increasing the Services’ space operations capability through 
organizational realignment.  The long-term approach identified the establishment of a 
Space military department or Space Service within DoD.  A mid term approach 
considered the establishment of a Space Corps within the Air Force.  These are 
revolutionary considerations and they are even more interesting when one considers  
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almost all of the recommendations from the Space Commission Report were 
implemented.  The Space Commission became the roadmap for aligning military space 
organizations for the future. 
Some members of the Army space community believe the establishment of a 
separate Space Force is a function of when, not if.  One of the reasons the Army would 
advocate this action is the belief that space support to the Joint Force Land Component 
Commander (JFLCC) would improve with a Space Force.  Currently, the Joint Force Air 
Component Command (JFACC) will be the Space Coordinating Authority (SCA) in the 
Joint Theater of operations.  Space support will likely be well coordinated and tailored to 
meet JFACC requirements.  It is not likely the JFLCC will enjoy the same level of space 
support.  If a Space Force were established, a Joint Force Space Component Command 
(JFSCC) would plan, integrate and execute space support for the Joint Force, not 
primarily for the JFACC.  The Space Commission may have recommended 
organizational changes that will in fact facilitate a Space Force:   
The commission stopped just short of calling for a separate U.S. Space 
corps or U.S. Space force, and instead put all the pieces in place to quickly 
create one of these organizations if the Air Force doesn’t successfully 
perform the Space mission. If you step back and look at the commission’s 
recommendations, you see they have put all the structure in place to 
quickly create the U.S. Space force.  The Undersecretary of the Air Force 
would become the Secretary of the Space Force, the National Security 
Space Office would become the secretariat staff and AFSPC becomes the 
service staff and forces.  The budget has also been created through 
designation of the Space military funding program 12.158 
The Army would benefit by reassessing its current space force organizations 
regardless of the emergence of a future U.S. Space Force.  The proposed Army space 
missions, existing space organizations, leadership, force structure, FA40 manpower 
allocations and the proper echelon for tactical Army space support are issues that will 
affect the future organization of Army space assets. 
Prior to the Space Commission report of 2001, the topic of a separate Space Force 
was being discussed at the highest levels of the military and national politics.  New 
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Hampshire Senator, Bob Smith, wrote, “If the Air Force cannot or will not embrace space 
power…, we in Congress will have to establish an entirely new Service.”159  The Air 
Force focus on aircraft acquisition, airpower doctrine and the career progression of pilots 
and airmen has dominated the space mission area. 
Many in DoD and the government believe that “space power can only reach its 
full potential through an independent space force, free from control by land, sea and air 
commanders, led by space commanders possessing specialized expertise.”160  In a pilot-
dominated Service, space will always be the second priority to air power.  This priority 
ensures space capabilities will not progress to an equal degree as that of air power 
capabilities.  This is not an Air Force Service problem nor is it an Air Force-Unique 
mindset.  Space operations enable all Service and Joint operations.  If space power is not 
a front-burner focal area of the Air Force, all of the Services’ warfighting operations will 
not be optimally enabled. 
The Army as well the Navy and Marines all have varying degrees of the problem 
discussed in the previous paragraph.  The Army leadership is not going to be supportive 
of increasing spending on space systems when large, billion-dollar programs such as the 
new self-propelled howitzer, the Crusader, or the newest helicopter, the Comanche, are 
cancelled.  Similarly, the Navy will focus on new or upgraded sea power systems.  The 
Army argues that because space is a Joint mission area and the Air Force is the Executive 
Agent for space, the Army should not be stripped of funding for its ground systems to 
focus on space systems and capabilities.  Similarly, the Air Force should not be stripped 
of funding for aircraft to pay for Joint space systems.          
The Space Commission did not recommend a separate Space Force be 
established, but the recommendation seemed to be based on timing, not an inherent lack 
of plausibility.  The Space Commission found “there is not yet a critical mass of qualified 
personnel, budget, requirements, or missions sufficient to establish a new department.”161  
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Long-term evolution of the space mission area may provide that critical mass.  Failure by 
the Air Force as DoD’s Executive Agent for space may also be this “critical mass” that 
establishes a separate Space Force.  It is not certain this critical mass will in fact emerge, 
but DoD and the nation would benefit if the Services developed “adequate leadership, 
personnel, and doctrine to create a solid foundation for a possible future Space Force.”162 
There is an equally compelling argument against almost every reason forwarded 
for establishing a separate Space Force.  The most powerful argument against a U.S. 
Space Force is it would further remove space operators from Joint and Service combat 
operations.  Adding another layer of bureaucracy with a Space Force will add to the 
difficulty of integrating space into combat operations.  The Army and the other Services 
all struggle to integrate space, and space integration is done by their own space experts 
within their respective Service.  Integrating space support to Joint/Service combat 
operations via a separate Space Force would be even more difficult. 
Regardless of the outcome concerning a U.S. Space Force, it is important to 
understand there are political and military factions pushing for the emergence of a 
military Space Department.    
                                                 




Up until this chapter, this paper has focused on providing a background for Army 
Space operations through multiple aspects – historical activities, current Army space 
organizations and missions, Army Transformation, Space Force Design Updates, desired 
capabilities, personnel, manning requirements, equipment, requirements documents, and 
sister Service approaches.  Chapter VIII presents recommendations and ideas which 
might enhance the Army’s current and future Space mission area performance. 
A brief summary of the recommendations follows: 
Organization:  Separate the mission areas of space and missile defense by 
restructuring the United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command. 
Leadership:  Select FA40 officers to command space-centric elements of SMDC 
at general officer level.  Do not limit the leadership of the Space and Missile Defense 
Command by excluding general officers from any branch of the Army.    
Personnel:  Do not place six-man Space Support Elements at UEx and UEy levels 
or FA40s at the RSTA and Fires Brigades. 
Materiel:  Immediately focus additional personnel and resources on the 
development of requirements documents for a tactical, ground-based Space Control 
Negation system in order to equip the 3rd Space Control Company. 
Training:  Increase the frequency of the Space Operations Officer Qualification 
Course and increase the number of students from the other Services. 
The recommendations are made according to the categories that make up the 
DOTMLFP (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, 
Facilities and Personnel) framework.  A detailed presentation of these recommendations 
is in the remaining sections of this chapter.  Not all categories of DOTMLFP are 
represented by recommendations.  The recommendations are based on existing  
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parameters, facts and lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq as well as personal 
opinion.  They are presented in an order representing broad, difficult, hard-to-implement 
recommendations down to comparatively easy-to-adapt recommendations.   
Within the next year, SMDC will publish a new Army Space Master Plan and the 
Space Cadre Strategy from the Space FORMAL process.  These documents should be the 
vehicles that formally address the following recommendation topic areas through a 
detailed analysis of the DOTMLFP framework.   
B. ORGANIZATION  
The existing organizational structure of SMDC should be changed.  The missile 
defense and space missions have been linked since the 1940s when emerging ballistic 
missile defense technology led to space launches.  This habitual association has lasted 
over 60 years and has outlived its usefulness.   
The SMDC is the lead Service for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) effort to 
field a Ground-based Mid-course Defense (GMD) System, the command element for 
operational GMD and Space units, and the Army Service Component Command for 
STRATCOM.  Aside from these areas of responsibility, SMDC also performs significant 
activities as an Army Major Command (MACOM), oversees a vast Research 
Development and Acquisition organization, several test and evaluation ranges inside and 
outside the continental U.S. and the only Battle Lab outside of the Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC).  Former Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Ronald Griffin 
assessed the wide array of tasks and responsibilities that faced the Command: 
the command carried out ‘responsibilities in scope and magnitude unlike 
any other Army organizations.’  It had ‘a significant operational mission in 
support of the warfighting CINCs’ because it was the Army component of 
the U.S. Space Command.  In its role as ‘an executive agent for the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization’ it has ‘a complex array of funding 
and tasking responsibilities,’ and ‘is directly responsible to the Army  
Acquisition Executive’ regarding acquisition matters.  In the course of 
‘accomplishing these missions, the command works with numerous non-
departmental agencies, the OSD staff and other military services.163 
                                                 
163 Seize the High Ground: The Army in Space and Missile Defense, 254. 
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General Griffin made these comments about the Army Space and Strategic 
Defense Command over 10 years ago - before it became SMDC, before the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Organization became MDA, and SPACECOM merged into 
STRATCOM. Today these diverse activities and concerns have multiplied and will 
continue to do so.  The best way for the Army and SMDC to meet these command 
responsibilities is to separate the mission areas and increase resources and command 
focus on them.   
This can be achieved in several ways.  The most dramatic way of doing this is for 
the Army to establish an Army Space Command separate from SMDC.  A separate 
MACOM could be established for each mission.  The functional specific organizational 
structure would be assigned and aligned with their respective command.  The biggest 
improvement in such realignment is the competing demands for manpower, funding and 
command focus would be eliminated.  A command would exist solely for the accelerated 
development of the space mission area in the Army.   
This approach is not currently warranted.  Today’s space forces do not require a 
separate MACOM structure.  The total number of FA40s, the Army’s Core Space Cadre, 
is less than 200, and there is only one Space Brigade and one active duty Space Battalion.  
This does not require a 3-Star command structure.  There is simply not enough current 
operational space force structure to warrant such a sweeping change.  Additionally, 
separating the SMDC RDA (Research, Development and Acquisition) or the test and 
experimentation directorates along space and missile defense lines would not aid their 
efforts.  Space and missile defense still share common technologies and facilities.  
Preserving these entities under the Deputy Commanding General (DCG-RDA) enables 
them to better leverage one another’s efforts and resources. SMDC is the Service 
Component Commander to STRATCOM and the Joint advocate for space and missile 
defense in Joint and Service forums.  The space mission area would not be well served 
without a 3-star general officer space advocate.  In the long-term, such a restructuring of 
the space and missile defense organizations may be appropriate but in the near-term 
another restructuring approach is more advantageous. 
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A more suitable change would be to establish additional DCGs under the 3-star 
MACOM.  The current structure shown in Figure 1 (see page 14) could be realigned and 
augmented, achieving an improved focus and efficiency in the mission areas.  A DCG for 
Space Operations (DCG-SO), a DCG for Missile Defense Operations (DCG-MD) and a 
directorate for Information Operations should be established while preserving the DCG 
for RDA.  The operational elements under the current, single DCG-O organization 
structure would be realigned accordingly.  The Future Warfare Center would remain as a 
separate subordinate directorate that answers directly to the main command group as 
opposed to one DCG.  The Combat Development Directorate would not work directly for 
the FWC and the technology developers.  An organizational chart of such a structure is 
shown at Figure 32.   
Figure 32. Recommended SMDC Organization Chart 
This reorganization and realignment would facilitate growth in the space mission 
areas as a separate DCG and staff could focus on manning, training and equipping 
existing and emerging operational units.  This also focuses the assignment of FA40s, as 
all FA40s would work in the DCG-SO except for a small number on the MACOM staff 
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and in the FWC, CDD and the DCG-RDA.  This is in step with the Army 
Transformation, which reduces the large staff elements in headquarters and focuses 
manpower in the operational units. 
This restructured organization would functionally align with USSTRATCOM.  
The Commanding General of SMDC is the Joint Functional Component Commander for 
Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD).  The CG and the DCG-MD would focus on this 
mission area while the DCG-SO and the Army space directorate at STRATCOM would 
be the Command’s lead in all JFCC Space and Global Strike activities.  Similarly, the 
Information Operations Directorate and the Army space directorate at STRATCOM 
would be the lead integrator for Army IO into JFCC Network Warfare operations.  This 
would enable the SMDC CG to engage in the three mission areas of missile defense, 
space and IO with general officer representation.  This structure would better allow the 
CG to focus his activities at STRATCOM as the JFCC-IMD, while still maintaining DCG 
and IO Directorate interaction with their respective STRATCOM injection points.      
Establishing a separate DCG command structure with Space as a stand-alone 
element also sets the foundation for a possible future merger of the Army and other 
Services’ Space forces into a U.S. Space Force.  The Space Commission Report discusses 
the establishment of a U.S. Space Force: 
The Department of Defense requires space systems that can be employed 
in independent operations or in support of air, land and sea forces to deter 
and defend against hostile actions directed at the interests of the United 
States.  In the midterm a Space Corps within the Air Force may be 
appropriate to meet this requirement; in the longer term, it may be met by 
a military department for space.164 
Untangling the organizational structure of the space and missile defense 
organizations will streamline any future restructuring of Joint and Service space forces.  
The former Director of the Force Development and Integration Center in SMDC was 
quoted in the Army Space Journal reference the possible establishment of a Space Force.   
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Regarding the possibility of a U.S. Space Force, COL (R) Glen Collins wrote in terms of 
an impending activation, “...it should be assumed that there will be a creation of a U.S. 
Space Force, and that the only remaining question is when.”165 
For these reasons it is in the best interest of Army Space and the Army as a whole 
to realign the Space and Missile Defense Command and establish a Deputy Commanding 
General - Space Operations (DCG-SO).  
C. LEADERSHIP 
The DCG – Space Operations should ideally be promoted from the FA40 career 
field to leverage the training, education and space expertise invested in the FA40 
community.  Command of SMDC or assignment as the DCG – Space Operations should 
not be limited to Air Defense Artillery officers.  This has largely been the case with 
exceptions such as GEN(R) Edward Anderson who commanded SMDC from 1996-1998.  
General Anderson was a Field Artillerymen and an exception to the consistent theme of 
having Air Defense Artillery officers becoming the SMDC Commanding General.  
However, there are currently no general officers that have been promoted from the FA40 
Career Field.  This may change in the future, but selecting general officers who are not 
necessarily from the Air Defense Artillery branch to command SMDC may help the 
space mission area and the FA40 community. 
Changing this paradigm is consistent with the Space Commission Report 
recommendation that the Secretary of Defense “end the practice of assigning only Air 
Force flight-rated officers to the position of CINCSPACE and CINCNORAD to ensure 
that an officer from any Service with an understanding of combat and space could be 
assigned to this position.”166  Similarly, any officer, regardless of their parent branch in 
the Army should be considered for command of SMDC or assignment as the DCG-Space 
Operations.   
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Missile Defense is enabled by space; it is not the purpose of space operations.  In-
depth knowledge of Air and Missile Defense is not equivalent to space expertise.  This is 
why the FA40 career field was established.  Ceding SMDC command to officers with Air 
and Missile Defense backgrounds serves the missile defense function of the command 
very well, but that same certainty cannot be applied to the space side of the MACOM. 
D. PERSONNEL 
The low-density FA40 population should not be distributed in an uneven manner.  
30% of the FA40 population should be in each of the three levels of Army space billets 
with 10% of the personnel participating in schools/training opportunities.  The greatest 
draw of personnel that will distort this balance is the SSEs at the UEx and UEy level.  
The Army space community should not allocate more than a third of its population to the 
SSEs.   
With very few FA40 unique tasks being conducted by Space operations officers 
on the Division staff elements, an objective strength of six FA40s per SSE is overkill to 
augment staff functions already being performed by other staff officers.  Lessons learned 
from Operation Iraqi Freedom and the 3rd Infantry Division SSE indicate that the areas 
resulting in “much combat-value added” were theater and global reachback to space 
products and services, support to Blue Force Tracking (BFT), and support to imagery and 
topography.   
Examples of theater and global reachback of the SSE for space products include 
accessing the Commercial Exploitation Team in theater or the Spectral Operations 
Resource Center (SORC) in Colorado Springs for panchromatic and spectral imaging and 
limited analysis.  The global reachback capability resident in an organic SSE is the only 
space-unique task considered of “much combat-value added” by the 3rd Infantry 
Division’s SSE in Iraq.  Identifying and monitoring the use of BFT devices and their 
architectures and the provision of existing imagery were also considered tasks with 
“much combat-value added”, but both are SSE enhancing tasks.  Another staff section is 
conducting their day-to-day operations and leveraging the SSE to improve their 
performance.  Access to these data and communications architectures could be achieved 
with improved network connectivity of existing staff elements.   
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An ARSST team deployed to support Operation Iraqi Freedom throughout 2004 
worked with several Joint and Coalition units in a variety of ways to enhance their 
operations.  The ARSST supported the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and trained 
Marines on the Blue Force Tracking (BFT) devices that were available and how the BFT 
architecture worked in-theater.  The ARSST also worked the fielding and distribution of 
BFT devices to US and United Kingdom (UK) Special Operations Forces and the UK 
Joint Helicopter Force and ensured the BFT devices were inserted into the theater’s Joint 
Restricted Frequency List (JRFL).  The ARSST trained the coalition and US soldiers on 
installation, use and troubleshooting of the BFT devices and assisted in connectivity of 
those BFT devices to the common operating pictures.  The ARSST advised the 1st MEF 
on how to mitigate the effectiveness of Iraqi GPS jamming operations.  Use of three-
dimensional (3D) fly-through simulations for mission rehearsals on the SATURN 
communications suite was very valuable.  Access to updated commercial imagery thru 
the Commercial Exploitation Team and reachback were also areas of value-added space 
activity.167   
The ARSSTs and SSEs have basically the same equipment and personnel.  Much 
of the value-added by these teams is made possible through connectivity in-theater and 
reachback to U.S. based operations centers.  Their functions could be provided without 
UEy SSEs at Corps and above, with 4-man UEx SSEs at Divisions, and without space 
operators at any brigade.  Value added to these organizations comes primarily from 
information that is already available or available upon request, not from space-unique 
tasks performed by FA40s.   
The ARSSTs and the organic SSEs in particular prepare and input space relevant  
information and planning considerations into staff estimates, operations plans, 
fragmentary orders and warning orders for their supported headquarters.  The UEx SSE 
prepares a Space Support Annex to the Division’s operation order.   
Several steps should be taken to reduce the number of FA40s currently being 
assigned to Corps (UEy), Division (UEx) and Brigade (UA) staffs.  SSEs should not be 
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assigned as an organic asset at Corps and above (UEy).  Corps headquarters already have 
an FA40 Space Operations Officer assigned to their staff.  If more robust space support is 
required at a Corps headquarters or higher, an ARSST should be attached to provide that 
augmentation.    
SSEs at division-level should be reduced to two FA40s and two communications 
NCOs and FA40s should not be assigned to RSTA and Fires Brigades.  The Army space 
community will always focus on tactical space support, but utilizing the preponderance of 
the FA40 population at corps, division and brigade-level organic staff elements is 
redundant and not proportional to the added combat-value. Dedicating close to 50% of 
the FA40s to enhance staff activities that are the responsibility of other sections should 
not be the primary use of a limited personnel asset such as the FA40s.   
The FA40 community should enhance performance in the Operational/Service 
and Strategic/Joint levels of the FA40 billets by developing FA40 acquisition officers and 
engineers.  Having acquisition specialists and engineering expertise would allow the 
Army space community to better fill positions in the Joint and Service Space Program 
Offices, Army and Joint R&D and S&T facilities and in the Army Program Executive 
Office – Space.  The Army space community currently has no dedicated acquisition 
support from officers who have come from the FA40 career field.  Acquisition officers 
come from every branch of the Army and may or may not have any experience and 
understanding of Army space operations.   Integration of Army space requirements into 
Joint space programs would be greatly enhanced if the FA40 community developed a 
Space acquisition and engineering force. 
The Army has assessed roughly ten individuals per eligible year group into the 
FA40 career fields.  This has historically taken place at the ten-year point in the officers’ 
career.  Future assessments of FA40s may occur earlier in the officers’ career and may 
increase in number.  With an average of ten incoming FA40 officers yearly, one officer 
should be sent to receive an advanced degree in engineering and DoD acquisition 
certification.  This would ensure Army-unique space interests and requirements are 
integrated and protected in the Joint and Service R&D, S&T and acquisition functional 
areas. 
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E. MATERIEL  
The Army should develop Service operational requirements for a tactical, ground-
based Space Control Negation system.  Such a requirement should be developed with a 
full compliment of Air Force, Navy, and Marine combat developers reviewing the 
documents and providing input and their Service-unique requirements.  The Army and 
Marines are the only Services focusing on space support to tactical ground forces.  The 
Army should establish a valid requirements document for a mobile, ground Space 
Negation system.  Such a capability requirement is commensurate with the established 
Joint and Service doctrinal publications that specifically identify Space Control as an 
Army mission area.   
The force structure for the Army Space Control Company is already at the 1st 
Space Brigade.  The organizational construct is in place for the Space Control Company 
and the Space Control Company is assigned the mission.  The missing pieces are the 
operational concept and the requirements documents for such a system.  A Space Control 
requirements document might logically become a Joint requirements document, but as the 
Service focused on mobile, ground-based, tactical space control, the Army space 
community should initiate the requirements development effort at SMDC and get the 
other Services to review and provide input.   
An Army Space Control system could be used globally to support Service, Joint 
and Coalition operations.  The 1st Space Brigade would be a force provider to 
STRATCOM to support JFCC-S&GS missions.  The Army needs to use its existing 
space control force structure in the 1st Space Battalion and an approved space control 
requirements document as a forcing function to validate the Army and Joint doctrinal 
publications that identify Space Control as an Army mission.  SMDC and their CDD 
need to present Army leadership with a decision brief which commits the Army to 
supporting the development of a space control system.  The Space Control mission is 
defined as an Army function in Joint and Army doctrine, Army Space Policy, and the 
Space Commission Report.  The Army has already approved space control force structure 
in the 1st Space Battalion.  Presented with this backdrop, the Army needs to approve 
space control requirements documents via the Army Requirements Oversight Council and  
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support these documents progression to a Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  If 
Space Control is an Army space function, the Army or Joint program offices need to 
equip the operational units who are responsible to execute this mission.  
A Space Control system requirements document should not focus on current 
technology developments but on a future capability.  This capability should include a 
sensor-to-shooter capability.  A Space Control System capability should include mobile 
Space Surveillance and Negation capabilities, the sensor-to-shooter pair.  To date, the 
Army has one initial validated Space Control System requirements document, a counter-
communications satellite Initial Capabilities Document (ICD).  This merely validates an 
initial concept.  An approved ICD for a counter-SATCOM system is literally years away 
from a Capabilities Production Document that would actually produce such a system.  
Development of the complete set of Space Control System requirements documents 
(ICD, CDD and CPD) should be the top priority for the Combat Development Directorate 
and one of SMDC’s top priorities as well.   
Developing these documents are best achieved by separating the requirements 
developers from the technology developers in the FWC as was depicted in the 
restructured organization chart (Figure 32) shown earlier in this chapter.  Army 
requirements development is a slow process that lags behind technology development.  If 
the Combat Developments Directorate works for the FWC, the Technology Center and 
the Battle Lab, requirements development will focus on validating the existing 
technology projects that are ongoing rather than developing future operational 
requirements.  SMDC is one of the only Commands in the Army and DoD where the 
requirements development personnel work for the acquisition and technology 
development directorate and this should be changed. 
The number of requirements development FA40s for the entire space mission area 
consists of one or two action officers augmented by a handful of DACs and contractors.  
An FA40 Colonel should lead the requirements development team for the Space mission 
area.  At least one FA40 LTC and three FA40 Majors, augmented by an equal number of 
DACs and contractors should be assigned to work requirements development for a Space  
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Control System.  This level of manning would enable an appropriate level of interaction 
and staffing with sister Services, Department of the Army and Joint Staffs, and other 
Joint and Service technology development centers.               
F. TRAINING 
The Army space community should ensure all officers assessed into the FA40 
career field attend the Space Operations Officer Qualification Course within one year of 
entry.  The course is currently taught on an average of twice a year.  The frequency of the 
course should be increased to three times per year until the backlog of officers waiting to 
attend has been reduced to the number of an average class size.  The backlog exists 
because multiple year groups of officers entered the FA40 Career Field when the 
opportunity became available in 1998.  The Space Operations Qualification Course is 
attended by active, reserve and National Guard personnel.  SMDC should strive to 
schedule as many students from other service branches as possible.  Increasing the Joint 
nature of the classes will increase the student’s understanding of the Joint nature of the 
Space mission area.    
Establish a memorandum of agreement with the Army’s proponent for 
Information Operation, TRADOC, to send FA40s to formal IO training.  FA40s located 
at ARSTRAT who are performing duties associated with ARSTRAT’s role as the Army 
lead for IO to STRATCOM need to attend the initial FA30 IO training.  The FA40 
training branch needs to incorporate formal Army IO training into the FA40 Qualification 
Course if SMDC/ARSTRAT is to adequately meet the responsibilities as the Service lead 
for IO integration at STRATCOM.   
If ARSTRAT/SMDC remains the Army’s lead role at STRATCOM for IO, the 
command should request through TRADOC and DA to be recognized as the Army’s 
proponent for IO.  Assignment of proponent duties would result in additional funding and 
resources to adequately perform IO integration for STRATCOM.  Denial of Information  
Operations proponency by TRADOC and DA would at least highlight the need for the 
Army’s IO proponent to assume an increased role at STRATCOM.  Using FA40s to lead 
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